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MICHAEL D. SOUSA*
Most individual debtors file for bankruptcy relief with honest intentions.
Nonetheless, there is also an underside to the American bankruptcy law system
that often goes unreported and ignored in the scholarly literature, namely, the
commission of fraud by debtors who seek protection under the Bankruptcy
Code. One of the ways in which fraud upon the bankruptcy system occurs is
when debtors intentionally conceal assets from the bankruptcy process. Indeed,
reported bankruptcy court decisions are rife with examples of debtors
attempting to hide or shield assets from their creditors. Debtors who are
discovered concealing assets are subject to certain civil remedies, such as the
dismissal of their bankruptcy case or the denial of the discharge of their
preexisting indebtedness. One of the ways to combat suspected fraud is to
authorize a bankruptcy trustee to conduct a search of a debtor's residence to
ensure compliance with the disclosure requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.
The issue of a bankruptcy trustee 's search of a debtor's home, and more
particularly the intersection between the Bankruptcy Code and the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, has been addressed in two prior court
decisions. On these occasions, the courts permitted a bankruptcy trustee to
search a debtor's home, albeit after the trustee first obtained a "search
order. "
Incredulously, the two courts failed to address whether they in fact had the
authority to order such a remedy. The issue is not free from doubt. Unlike
other federal statutes that specifically authorize an administrative search, the
Bankruptcy Code does not provide a statutory scheme authorizing a search of
a debtor's home to uncover concealed assets. Consequently, there is presently
a casus omissus, or an "unprovided-for case," in federal bankruptcy law.
Thus, the purpose of this Article is to address this gap by answering whether a
bankruptcy court has the requisite authority to issue what is in effect a search
warrant for a debtor's residence. I answer this question in the affirmative, and
contend that a bankruptcy court can utilize two sources of authority to issue a
search order of a debtor's home, namely, the Federal All Writs Act and § 105
of the Bankruptcy Code. While admittedly counterarguments exist for the
reliance upon these two sources of authority, which are addressed herein, they
do provide a reasonable basis for a bankruptcy court to order a search of a
debtor's home.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been repeatedly noted that federal consumer bankruptcy law serves
two distinct purposes: first, to provide an individual debtor with a "fresh start"
in life free from preexisting indebtedness; and second, to enable the debtor's
various creditors to recognize an equitable distribution of the debtor's available
assets.1 While many, if not most, individual debtors file for bankruptcy
protection with honest intentions, there is also an underside to the current
American bankruptcy system that often goes unreported and ignored in the
scholarly literature, namely, the commission of fraud by debtors who seek
I Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for Financial
Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 515, 515-16 (1991) ("The
essence of our consumer bankruptcy law is the discharge. The discharge of a consumer
debtor frees the debtor from the shackles of existing debt and places him on the economic
treadmill once again-to earn, consume and borrow." (footnotes omitted)); Charles G.
Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an
Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 50 (1986) ("One firmly established tenet of
time-worn bankruptcy lore holds, of course, that the bankruptcy system serves two
functions: the protection and payment of creditors; and the provision of shelter and a 'fresh
start' to overburdened debtors."); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy
Law, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1393, 1393 (1985) ("The principle advantage bankruptcy offers an
individual lies in the benefits associated with discharge. Unless he has violated some norm
of behavior specified in the bankruptcy laws, an individual who resorts to bankruptcy can
obtain a discharge from most of his existing debts in exchange for surrendering either his
existing nonexempt assets or, more recently, a portion of his future earnings."); George H.
Singer, Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Fundamentals of Nondischargeability in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 Am. BANKR. L.J. 325, 325 (1997) ("Bankruptcy law is grounded
upon the public policy of freeing the honest, but unfortunate, debtor from the financial
burdens of prepetition indebtedness and thereby allowing the debtor to make an
unencumbered fresh start."); see also Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1974)
(noting that "[i]t is the twofold purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to convert the estate of the
bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors and then to give the bankrupt a fresh
start with such exemptions and rights as the statute left untouched" (citing Burlingham v.
Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913))).
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protection under the Bankruptcy Code. More specifically, fraud upon the
bankruptcy system is committed when debtors intentionally conceal the extent
of their assets available for distribution to creditors. Reported bankruptcy court
decisions are rife with examples of debtors attempting to hide or shield assets
from their creditors.2 Indeed, inspections of debtors' homes by bankruptcy
trustees have in the past proved fruitful for the discovery of undisclosed assets.
3
To help combat the suspected fraudulent concealment of assets by debtors
in bankruptcy, in a prior article I proposed a framework under which a
bankruptcy trustee could conduct a warrantless search of a debtor's residence
under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 4 upon suspicion that the
debtor was attempting to commit fraud by failing to disclose assets to the
2 See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 382 F.3d 598, 602-03 (6th Cir. 2004) (debtor
convicted under the criminal law for concealing an asset from the bankruptcy trustee); Vill.
of San Jose v. McWilliams, 284 F.3d 785, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2002) (debtors denied discharge
after attempting to transfer property prior to commencing bankruptcy); United States v.
Cluck, 143 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Thus, before invoking the power of Title 11, he
perceived that it might be useful to keep some Jaguars in reserve, some money within easy
access, and, maybe, just for good measure, a few of his favorite things beyond the reach of
his creditors and the bankruptcy court."); United States v. Christner, 66 F.3d 922, 923 (8th
Cir. 1995) (debtor convicted under 28 U.S.C. § 152 for concealing approximately $36,000
from the bankruptcy proceeding); Boroffv. Tully (In re Tully), 818 F.2d 106, 107 (1st Cir.
1987) (debtor denied discharge for failing to disclose significant assets in the bankruptcy
process); Stegeman v. United States, 425 F.2d 984, 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1970) (debtors
convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 152 after fraudulently transferring certain assets to third
parties before the institution of an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against them); United
States v. Shapiro, 101 F.2d 375, 376, 380 (7th Cir. 1939) (debtor convicted of concealing
money from the bankruptcy trustee); United States v. Conner, 25 F. Cas. 595, 595 (C.C.D.
Mich. 1845) (No. 14,847) (debtor indicted under criminal law for failing to disclose certain
assets in the bankruptcy proceeding); Youngman v. Bursztyn (In re Bursztyn), 366 B.R. 353,
362 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (debtor attempted to conceal approximately $250,000 worth of
assets from the bankruptcy proceeding); U.S. Tr. v. Gardner (In re Gardner), 344 B.R. 663,
668 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (debtor denied discharge for failing to disclose his interest in a
corporation); Jeffrey M. Goldberg & Assocs. v. Holstein (In re Holstein), 299 B.R. 211, 233
(Bankr. N.D. 11. 2003) (debtor denied discharge for fraudulently concealing assets from the
bankruptcy court); Roudebush v. Sharp (In re Sharp), 244 B.R. 889, 891 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2000) (debtor denied discharge for intentionally concealing assets from the bankruptcy
court); Banc One, Tex., N.A. v. Braymer (In re Braymer), 126 B.R. 499, 503-04 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1991) (debtor denied discharge after exhibiting a pattern of behavior to hide assets
from her creditors). This list simply serves as an illustration, and is certainly not exhaustive.
3 See, e.g., In re Washington, 232 B.R. 814, 816-17 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) (after one
of the debtor's children let the bankruptcy trustee into the debtor's house, the trustee
discovered various previously undisclosed assets).
4 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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bankruptcy court.5 In short, I advanced the thesis that a bankruptcy trustee,
though bound by the Fourth Amendment, can conduct a warrantless search of a
debtor's home based upon three distinct theories, namely, that: (1) the
bankruptcy process is akin to a "special needs" administrative search exception
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement; (2) the bankruptcy law system
amounts to a "closely regulated industry" under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence; and (3) a debtor impliedly consents to the search of her home
based upon the intrusive nature of the bankruptcy process along with the
trustee's statutory duties to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor.6
As noted in the prior article, the intersection of the Fourth Amendment and
bankruptcy law, and, more precisely, the ability of a bankruptcy trustee to
search a debtor's residence upon suspicion that the debtor is fraudulently
concealing assets from the bankruptcy process, has been addressed in two prior
reported decisions, Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman)7 and Youngman v. Bursztyn
(In re Bursztyn).8 As will be discussed in more detail below, both decisions
enabled a bankruptcy trustee to search a debtor's home; however, the two courts
permitted the search only after the bankruptcy trustee first obtained a search
order.
Perhaps incredulously, the Barman and Bursztyn courts both failed to
address whether they in fact had the authority to order such a remedy. The issue
is hardly free from doubt. Unlike other federal statutes that specifically
contemplate or authorize an administrative search, such as the Occupational
Safety and Health Act,9 the Bankruptcy Code does not provide a statutory
scheme authorizing a search of a debtor's home to uncover concealed assets.
Consequently, there is presently a casus omissus, or an "unprovided-for case,"
in federal bankruptcy law.' 0 Consequently, the purpose of this Article is to
address this gap in answering whether a bankruptcy court even has the authority
to issue what is in effect a search warrant for a debtor's residence, assuming one
is required in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment.
I answer this inquiry in the affirmative, and contend that a bankruptcy court
can utilize two sources of authority to issue such an order, namely, the Federal
All Writs Act and § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code. Another potential source of
5 See Michael D. Sousa, A Delicate Balancing Act: Satisfying the Fourth Amendment
While Protecting the Bankruptcy System from Debtor Fraud, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 367
(2011).6 1d at 375.
7 252 B.R. 403 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
8 366 B.R. 353 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).
929 U.S.C. § 657 (2006); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(a) (2011) (noting that an
appropriate OSHA official can take action, including "compulsory process," to occasion a
search of an employer's premises). "Compulsory process" has been interpreted to include ex
parte search warrants. Amoco Oil Co. v. Marshall, 496 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (S.D. Tex.
1980).
10 Black's Law Dictionary defines "casus omissus" as "[a] situation not provided for by
a statute or contract, and therefore governed by caselaw or new judge-made law." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 247 (9th ed. 2009).
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authority, namely, the "inherent powers doctrine," is also considered, though it
appears unlikely that a bankruptcy court could rely on this "nebulous"
doctrine.'1 But even in arguing that the All Writs Act and § 105 of the Code
offer such authority, a point of caution is in order. Though these two statutes
provide reasonable authority for a bankruptcy court to so act, admittedly, well-
grounded counterarguments do exist. Thus, my arguments herein do not escape
criticism. But if this Article engenders a discussion on this important issue
among the courts or scholars, or both, the time in drafting would prove well
spent.
This Article will proceed in several parts. Part II provides the reader with a
brief contextual overview of the consumer bankruptcy process. Part III
discusses the prior court decisions permitting a warrant-based search of a
debtor's home. Part IV then discusses the court decisions disclaiming the
authority of a bankruptcy court to issue a search warrant. Next, Part V argues
that the Federal All Writs Act and § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code can serve as
authority for a bankruptcy court to issue a search warrant for a debtor's home if
the trustee suspects the concealment of assets from the bankruptcy process. This
section also considers the potential authority under the inherent powers
doctrine. Finally, Part VI offers a brief conclusion.
II. BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE MECHANICS OF CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY LAW12
Individuals contemplating filing for bankruptcy protection can generally
choose to file either for Chapter 7, Chapter 13, or Chapter 11. The ultimate
decision of selecting a particular chapter of the Bankruptcy Code largely
depends upon the debtor's financial status and the significance of her assets.
The most common type of bankruptcy case for individual debtors is a
liquidation proceeding governed by Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 13 Once
a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition is filed, 14 the Bankruptcy Code mandates that a
bankruptcy trustee be appointed to serve in the case. 15 The primary function of
a bankruptcy trustee in a Chapter 7 proceeding 16 is to collect and liquidate
11 See Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (describing the
inherent powers doctrine as "nebulous" and a "shadowy" concept).
12 This section is adapted from my prior article. See Sousa, supra note 5, at 375-78.
13 CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 1.23, at 92 (2d ed. 2009) ("A
chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy case is the norm. The majority of all bankruptcy filings,
over 60%, are liquidation bankruptcies under chapter 7."); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784.
14 The commencement of a bankruptcy case is usually a voluntary act by the debtor.
However, the Bankruptcy Code provides for the involuntary filing of a bankruptcy petition
against a debtor, if certain conditions are met. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 700.02
(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010); see also 11 U.S.C. § 303(b).
15 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-702.
16 See generally id. § 704 (specifying duties of the trustee).
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"property of the estate" 17 that is otherwise not exempt from the bankruptcy
process, and in turn to distribute any proceeds from the liquidation of the assets
to creditors in accordance with the priority scheme set forth in the Bankruptcy
Code. 18
During the pendency of a bankruptcy case, creditors are enjoined, or
"stayed," from most attempts to collect their claims from the debtor or the
bankruptcy estate. 19 In exchange for turning over any non-exempt assets to the
bankruptcy trustee for eventual liquidation, the Chapter 7 debtor is permitted to
retain her post-petition earnings free from the claims of her pre-bankruptcy
creditors.20 The goal of a consumer debtor in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceeding is to obtain a discharge of her pre-petition indebtedness, 21 which
results in the extinguishment of the debtor's in personam liability for the debt.
22
In contrast to Chapter 7, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code enables
individual debtors generally to retain their pre-petition assets in exchange for
repaying a portion of their future disposable income to creditors through a
court-approved repayment plan.23 A Chapter 13 debtor is protected from the
collection efforts of her creditors by virtue of the automatic stay while the plan
of repayment is developed and thereafter approved by the court.24 In a Chapter
13 bankruptcy case, the Chapter 13 "standing trustee" serves as the principal
17 Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition a mythical bankruptcy "estate" is created
that is comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case." Id. § 541(a)(1).
181n re Tarrant, 349 B.R. 870, 875 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2006) ("A 'Chapter 7 trustee's
duty is to reduce to money the legal or equitable interests owned by the debtor in these
various assets so that the proceeds may be distributed to unsecured creditors in accordance
with Section 726."' (citing In re Talbert, 268 B.R. 811, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2001))).
19See generally 11 U.S.C. § 362 (specifying ways in which a bankruptcy filing
operates as a stay of creditor collection efforts).20 Id. § 541 (a)(6) (including in property of the estate "[p]roceeds, product, offspring,
rents, or profits of or from property of the estate, except such as are earnings from services
performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case"); see also TABB,
supra note 13, § 1.1, at 3 ("An individual debtor thus may keep his future earnings for
himself, free from the claims of his pre-bankruptcy creditors.").
21 Edwards v. Sieger (In re Sieger), 200 B.R. 636, 638 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1996) ("'The
goal of all bankruptcy legislation is to achieve a just and equitable distribution of the estate
to the creditors and to relieve the honest debtor of his debts, giving him a fresh start."'
(quoting In re Epstein, 39 B.R. 938, 941 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1984))).
22 Notably, "a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim-
namely, an action against the debtor in personam-while leaving intact another-namely, an
action against the debtor in rem." Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991).
23 2 NANCY C. DREHER & JOAN N. FEENEY, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 13:1 (5th ed.
2009); see also In re McCollum, 348 B.R. 377, 393 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006) ("As part of the
deal a debtor makes with his or her creditors when electing to file under chapter 13, as
opposed to chapter 7, the debtor retains all pre-petition property in exchange for committing
all post-petition disposable income to the payment of creditors under a plan of
reorganization." (citing In re Burgie, 239 B.R. 406, 410 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999))); In re
Golek, 308 B.R. 332, 338 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 2004).24 DREHER & FEENEY, supra note 23, § 13:1.
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administrator in the proceeding. 25 Unlike the Chapter 7 trustee, the Chapter 13
trustee does not sell the debtor's property. Rather, the Chapter 13 trustee's main
responsibility is to collect a debtor's plan payments and to distribute the funds
to the creditors in accordance with the court-approved plan.26 That said,
however, like the Chapter 7 trustee, the Chapter 13 trustee is also charged with
the responsibility of investigating the financial affairs of the debtor and
opposing the discharge of the debtor, if warranted. 27 With certain limited
exceptions, a Chapter 13 debtor will receive a discharge of preexisting debts
only after all payments are made under the court-approved plan.28
An individual debtor's fresh start is accomplished through the discharge of
most of her pre-petition indebtedness. 29 Unless the individual debtor violates a
proscribed form of behavior contained within the Bankruptcy Code or
developed through federal bankruptcy law, 30 an individual who files for
bankruptcy relief can ordinarily obtain a discharge from the majority of her pre-
petition debts in exchange for surrendering any non-exempt assets. 31
25 1d. § 13:9.
261d.
27 See 11 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006).
28 See id. § 1328(a).
29 In perhaps the most cited recitation of the fresh start principle, the Supreme Court of
the United States stated as follows in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt:
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to 'relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.' This purpose of
the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being of public as well as
private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for
distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in
life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement
of pre[e]xisting debt.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citation omitted); see also U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs. v. Smith, 807 F.2d 122, 123-24 (8th Cir. 1986) ("The bankruptcy
laws embody a congressional policy to free an honest debtor from his financial burdens and
thus allow him to make an unencumbered fresh start." (citing Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S.
642, 645-46 (1974))).30 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 727(a); id. § 1328(a). The types of prohibited conduct that
would lead to a denial of the discharge relate to either the debtor's behavior leading up to the
bankruptcy filing or her conduct during the bankruptcy proceeding itself. For example, a
court may deny a Chapter 7 debtor's discharge if she: (i) transferred or concealed any
property from the bankruptcy process so as to defraud any creditor; (ii) transferred or
destroyed property within one year before the filing date with the intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud a creditor; (iii) transferred or destroyed "property of the estate" after the bankruptcy
petition is filed; (iv) concealed, destroyed, mutilated or falsified any financial documents; (v)
made a false oath or presented a false claim in connection with the bankruptcy case; or (vi)
failed to obey any lawful order of the bankruptcy court. Id. § 727(a).
31 See Jackson, supra note 1, at 1393.
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III. PRIOR DECISIONS PERMITTING A WARRANT-BASED SEARCH OF A
DEBTOR'S RESIDENCE
32
As previously noted, to date only two reported decisions have squarely
addressed the question of whether a bankruptcy trustee can conduct a search of
a debtor's home, and its related intersection with the Fourth Amendment. Both
decisions ultimately authorized a search of a debtor's home after the bankruptcy
trustee first obtained a "search order" from the court.
The first reported decision to address the intersection of bankruptcy law and
the Fourth Amendment is Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman).33 In Barman,
Norman Barman filed a petition for Chapter 7 relief,34 and in his schedules
accompanying the bankruptcy petition, Barman listed wearing apparel worth
$500 as his only asset.35 However, Barman was apparently engaged in a scheme
to place his personal property beyond the reach of his creditors and to purchase
parcels of real property in the names of others in order to avoid liability to his
creditors. 36 Upon learning of this plan, the bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint
against Barman, alleging in part that he fraudulently transferred funds to his
wife for the purchases of various homes and concealed assets belonging to the
bankruptcy estate. 37 In addition, the trustee sought to revoke Barman's
discharge. 38
The bankruptcy trustee subsequently filed an ex parte motion for an order
authorizing the trustee to enter Barman's home in order to inspect, inventory,
and appraise any property found within the home.39 The bankruptcy court
32 This section is adapted from my prior article. See Sousa, supra note 5, at 382-90.
33 252 B.R. 403 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
34 Id. at 407.
35Id.
36Id.
371d
381d.
39 Barman, 252 B.R. at 407. The need to request ex parte relief was premised on the
trustee's belief that given Barman's past machinations of moving assets, a less than complete
inventory would occur if the debtor received prior notice of any home inspection. Id. at 409-
10. In particular, the trustee's application to the court provided as follows:
The Trustee's counsel was informed, on December 17, 1999 that the Debtor had a
trailer at his residence... that contained personal property of the Debtor and/or the
Debtor's wife. This information was provided to the Trustee by a party that is involved
with post-petition business litigation involving the Debtor and persons/entities related to
the Debtor .... In addition to the existence of the trailer, the Trustee was informed that
according to what was witnessed at the residence, including the condition of the house
and the existence of a mobile home near the premises, it appeared that the Debtor and
his family may be moving from that residence. The Trustee has expedited the filing of
both an adversary proceeding against the Debtor and related parties and this motion to
avoid the likely irreparable harm to the bankruptcy estate in light of the Debtor's history
of flight and defiance of previous bankruptcy court orders.
Id. at 409 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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granted the motion, and entered what was denominated as an "inspection
order."40
Following the subsequent search, Barman attempted to suppress the
evidence obtained by the bankruptcy trustee during the search of his home on
the grounds that the search violated his rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.41 In ruling on the suppression motion,
the Barman court first concluded that a bankruptcy trustee has a sufficiently
close nexus to "government and its power that it is necessary and appropriate to
apply to the trustee the [F]ourth [A]mendment limits on government power."42
After concluding that a bankruptcy trustee constitutes an actor bound by the
Fourth Amendment, the court then considered the nature and scope of a debtor's
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. On this note, the
bankruptcy court observed that debtors have a significantly reduced expectation
of privacy in their homes, which "is a natural consequence of the substantial
and detailed disclosures that are inherent in the bankruptcy process." 43
Despite this conclusion, however, the bankruptcy court did not go so far as
to hold that a debtor has no reasonable expectation of privacy in her residence
or personal property upon filing for bankruptcy relief.44 For the Barman court,
three considerations militated against such a finding. First, the court noted that
unlike a debtor's bankruptcy petition and accompanying financial disclosures
and schedules which are publicly obtainable documents, an inspection of a
debtor's home is not open to the public domain. 45 Second, the court observed
that "nothing in the Bankruptcy Code states or implies an obligation upon a
debtor to permit an inspection by a trustee without a court order."46 That is,
"[n]either the obligation to file written disclosures nor the obligation to appear
at the creditors' meeting relates at all to an inspection of a debtor's residence by
the trustee."47 The court further noted that a debtor's statutory obligation to
cooperate with a bankruptcy trustee in the administration of the estate "has
never been construed to require a debtor to allow an inspection without a court
order."48 Third, the court held that although the Bankruptcy Code causes the
debtor's property to be brought into the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition, "the estate's interest in the property is quite limited, both in
time and in function, and the debtor retains a substantial practical and beneficial
interest in that property even while it is temporarily property of the estate." 49
40 Id. at 410.
4 1
Id.
4 2 Id. at 413.
4 3 1d. at 414.
44Id.
4 5 Barman, 252 B.R. at 414.
46Id.
47Id.
48Id.
4 9 Id. at 415.
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Having determined that a bankruptcy trustee is bound by the Fourth
Amendment and that a debtor in bankruptcy still possesses a reduced
expectation of privacy in her residence, the Barman court then defined the
specific protections to which a debtor in bankruptcy is entitled under the Fourth
Amendment. 50 Relying upon Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the context of
administrative inspections and searches, the court employed the balancing test
espoused by the Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court,51 namely,
weighing the need to search against the invasion of privacy and disruption
engendered by the search itself.
52
In balancing the competing interests of the bankruptcy system for full and
candid disclosures by debtors against an individual's expectation of privacy in
the home, the Barman court conceded that "experience demonstrates that in
carrying out the trustee's obligations under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee
may need to inspect a debtor's residence for property of the estate." 53
Significantly, and again as the court recognized, "such a need may arise when,
as here, the trustee has reason to believe that there are undisclosed assets to be
administered for the benefit of the estate." 54 The court further observed that
bankruptcy trustees may have no way to fulfill the statutory obligation to
account for all of the property of the estate without an inspection of a debtor's
residence. 55 To this end, the Barman court concluded that as a result of a
debtor's obligation to disclose all of her assets and cooperate with the
bankruptcy trustee as a condition to receiving a discharge of indebtedness, a
search of a debtor's home may "be a crucial part of the process and therefore a
matter of substantial need."56 Perhaps more strikingly, the court concluded "that
a procedure for an inspection order in bankruptcy would be an ordinary part of
the judicial and administrative processes of bankruptcy. 57 Because the court
believed that "allowing trustees to perform inspections without a court order
would be 'out of place,' ' 58 the Barman court permitted the trustee's search after
entering a carefully tailored "inspection order."59
501d.
51 387 U.S. 523, 534, 536-37 (1967).
52 Barman, 252 B.R. at 416.53 Id.
54I d55 1d. at 417.
561d.
57Id.
58 Barman, 252 B.R. at 417 (citing Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 324 (1971)).
59 1d. at 418. The inspection order entered by the court contained the following
restrictions. First, the bankruptcy trustee must file a written motion requesting an inspection
order setting forth the facts establishing reason to believe that there is property of the estate
on the premises to be inspected. Second, the motion should presumptively be filed according
to the regular motion process utilized by the court, that is, upon notice and an opportunity for
the debtor to be heard. Third, the motion should seek to conduct the search during regular
business hours, in the debtor's presence, and without forcible entry. Fourth, the
contemplated order must identify the premises to be inspected. Fifth, and finally, any
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While the Barman court recognized the need for a bankruptcy trustee to
comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and procure what is
tantamount to a search warrant of a debtor's home prior to engaging in any
search, the court failed to articulate its source of authority for issuing such an
order.
Approximately seven years after the Barman decision, another court issued
its opinion in Youngman v. Bursztyn (In re Bursztyn).60 In Bursztyn, Miriam
Bursztyn filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 61 On her bankruptcy petition, Bursztyn listed as her only
assets: a bank account, costume jewelry, nominal household goods and clothing,
a claim against her former husband, and two used luxury vehicles. 62 During the
course of the bankruptcy trustee's investigation into Bursztyn's financial affairs,
however, the trustee obtained two written judicial decisions rendered in the
Debtor's ongoing state court divorce proceedings that belied the disclosures
made by Bursztyn on her bankruptcy petition and accompanying schedules. 63 In
short, the state court record indicated that Bursztyn retained a significant
collection of artwork and jewelry, items not disclosed on her bankruptcy
petition and schedules. 64
Based upon this development, the trustee applied ex parte to the bankruptcy
court for an order authorizing her to enter Bursztyn's residence "with the
assistance of the United States Marshal's Service, her counsel, and an appraiser
to search for, seize, and appraise estate property located within the residence." 65
After evaluating the trustee's request, the bankruptcy court entered an order
authorizing the bankruptcy trustee, her counsel, an appraiser, and
representatives of the U.S. Marshals Service to enter Bursztyn's residence
during normal business hours to search for, seize, and appraise any uncovered
assets, namely, artwork and jewelry. 66 The bankruptcy trustee subsequently
uncovered various fine jewelry and artwork amounting to approximately
$243,000.00, located in various places in the home, including in laundry bags
and suitcases tucked away in the bottom of the debtor's bedroom closet.6 7
Bursztyn thereafter filed an opposition to the bankruptcy trustee's actions, but
the court concluded that the bankruptcy trustee's search of her residence was
reasonable under the circumstances, and thus, constitutional. 68
warrant granted by the court would not authorize the seizure of any property, only the
inspection, inventory, and appraisal of such property. Id.
60366 B.R. 353 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).
6 1 Id. at 355.
62 1d. at 356.
63 1d. The second of these state court matrimonial decisions was issued only three
months before Bursztyn filed her bankruptcy petition. Id.64Id. at 358-59.
65Id. at 360.
66 Bursztyn, 366 B.R. at 360-61.67 1d. at 361-62.
68 1d. at 373-74.
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The analysis in Bursztyn largely reflected the legal conclusions reached by
the Barman decision with respect to a debtor's expectations of privacy under
the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the Bursztyn court explicitly adopted the
balancing test created by the U.S. Supreme Court in determining the
reasonableness of a search in instances of civil administrative searches. 69
Furthermore, like Barman, the Bursztyn decision recognized that in performing
her duties, a bankruptcy trustee may need to inspect a debtor's residence for
potentially undisclosed assets of the estate to be administered for the benefit of
creditors.70 Indeed, as both decisions acknowledge, "a trustee may have no
alternative in carrying out her statutory obligations to marshal and account for
all of the property of the estate without an inspection of the debtor's
residence. '71 However, like Barman, the Bursztyn court did not reflect on its
ability to issue a search order for a debtor's residence. The decision is silent on
this front.
Nonetheless, Barman and Bursztyn affirmatively demonstrate the necessity
of sometimes permitting a bankruptcy trustee to conduct a search of a debtor's
home in order to uncover potentially undisclosed assets belonging to the
bankruptcy estate. The unexamined inquiry in both judicial decisions and in the
existing scholarly literature is whether a bankruptcy court can even order a
search of a debtor's home. As noted in Barman, no provision in the Bankruptcy
Code or Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure currently authorizes a search of
a debtor's home as incident to a bankruptcy trustee's duties to investigate the
financial affairs of a debtor. Adding to the dilemma is the fact that bankruptcy
courts are not in accord as to whether they possess the authority to order a
search of a debtor's residence.
IV. PRIOR DECISIONS DISCLAIMING THE AUTHORITY OF A BANKRUPTCY
COURT TO ISSUE A SEARCH WARRANT
In In re Trustee in Bankruptcy for Search Warrant to Undercover Property
of Estate Held in Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152,72 the bankruptcy trustee sought
the issuance of a search warrant to uncover assets allegedly belonging to the
bankruptcy estate.73 The terse reported opinion does not provide any
background facts, so it is unknown whether the trustee sought the search
warrant to inspect the debtor's home. It is also unclear whether the bankruptcy
trustee sought the warrant for purely civil purposes, namely, to locate assets in
69 Id. at 369-70.
70 1d. at 372 (citing Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403, 416 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 2000)).7 11d. at 372 (citing Barman, 252 B.R. at 416-17).
72 173 B.R. 341 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
7 31d. at 342. Section 152 of the 18 U.S.C. makes it a bankruptcy crime for a debtor to
knowingly and fraudulently conceal assets from a bankruptcy proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 152
(2006).
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the administration of the bankruptcy estate, or for the purpose of establishing
the debtor's commission of a bankruptcy crime.
Nevertheless, the decision is instructive because in denying the trustee's
request for a search warrant, the court relied upon Rule 41 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure as its source of controlling authority. 74 Rule 41(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a search warrant may be
issued only "[a]t the request of a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney
for the government."'75 In turn, Rule 41(a)(2)(C) defines "[f]ederal law
enforcement officer" to mean "a government agent (other than an attorney for
the government) who is engaged in enforcing the criminal laws and is within
any category of officers authorized by the Attorney General to request a search
warrant."'76 While a bankruptcy trustee is a state actor for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment,77 a bankruptcy trustee is neither a federal law enforcement officer
nor an attorney for the government. Consequently, and correctly, the court
declined to issue the search warrant pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
In In re Skinner,78 the Chapter 7 trustee filed a motion for authority to enter
the residence of a non-debtor party to search for assets allegedly belonging to
the debtors' bankruptcy estate. 79 Specifically, one of the debtors informed the
trustee during the bankruptcy proceeding that he had hidden large sums of
money in his former marital residence. 80 Accordingly, the trustee requested
permission to enter the former residence, in which the debtor no longer had any
legal or equitable interest, in order to search for the hidden money.81 Relying
upon the decision in In re Trustee in Bankruptcy for Search Warrant to
Undercover Property of Estate Held in Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152, the
Skinner court denied the trustee's motion, concluding that a bankruptcy trustee
has no authority to apply for a search warrant under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41.82 In other words, the court in Skinner similarly relied upon Rule
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as the possible source of
authority for a bankruptcy court to issue a search order of a debtor's home.
Finally, in Spacone v. Burke (In re Truck-A-Way), 83 Hank Spacone was
appointed as the Chapter 7 trustee to administer the assets of corporate debtor
Truck-A-Way.84 The principal of Truck-A-Way, James Burke, had filed his
7 4 In re Tr. in Bankr. for Search Warrant, 173 B.R. at 342.
75 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (b).76 d. R. 41(a)(2)(C).
77 Sousa, supra note 5, at 378-82.
781n re Skinner, 336 B.R. 316 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005).
7 9 1d. at 316-17.
80 Id. at 317.
8 1 Id.
821d. at 317-19.
83 300 B.R. 31 (E.D. Cal. 2003).
84 Id. at 33.
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own separate personal bankruptcy petition. 85 Counsel for the trustees for both
the Truck-A-Way bankruptcy estate and the estate of James Burke filed an ex
parte application for an order authorizing the entry into and search of residences
owned by Burke in an effort to uncover property allegedly belonging to the
bankruptcy estates.86 The bankruptcy court granted the application. 87 Because
the trustees' subsequent conduct in executing the search seemingly exceeded
the scope of the search and seizure order, Burke's wife filed a motion seeking to
disqualify counsel for the Truck-A-Way bankruptcy estate. 88
In the course of rendering its opinion on the motion to disqualify counsel,
the court in Truck-A-Way addressed the propriety of a bankruptcy trustee
searching a debtor's property under the Fourth Amendment. The court initially
noted that any residence search would first require the attainment of a warrant.89
The court then held that any application for a search warrant cannot circumvent
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment or Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.9" That is, despite the recognized civil nature of the
bankruptcy trustee's search, the court nonetheless concluded that the only
avenue for a trustee to seek a search warrant is through Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 91 Following prior precedent, the Truck-A-Way
court held that a bankruptcy trustee has no authority to seek a warrant under
Rule 41 because a trustee is "neither a federal 'law enforcement officer' nor 'an
attorney for the government.'"92 Significantly, the court added to its analysis by
stating the following: "Clearly the explicit requirements of Rule 41 reflect the
exacting mandate of the Fourth Amendment and cannot be circumvented by the
statutory structure created by the Bankruptcy Code."93
As will be explicated below, the reliance upon Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41 as the source of authority for a trustee to seek, and a court to
issue, a search order for a debtor's residence is simply incorrect. However, the
Federal All Writs Act and § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code do provide the
reasonable authority for a bankruptcy court to issue a search order.
85 Id. at 33 n.4.
86Id. at 33.
87 1d.
88Id. at 35.
89 Truck-A- Way, 300 B.R. at 35 ("Counsel employed ex parte procedures to obtain an
order to search defendant's residences in Nevada and Southern California and seize property
that he believed belonged to the bankruptcy estate. As he embarked on this effort, counsel
never provided the bankruptcy court the statutory or caselaw authority, save reference to 11
U.S.C. § 105(a), to support a warrantless search and seizure.").
90 d. at 37 (E.D. Cal. 2003); see also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105 n.1
(1965) ("The Fourth Amendment's policy against unreasonable searches and seizures finds
expression in Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.").
91 Truck-A-Way, 300 B.R. at 36-37.92 1d. at 37 (quoting In re Tr. in Bankr. for Search Warrant to Undercover Prop. of
Estate Held in Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152, 173 B.R. 341, 342 (N.D. Ohio 1994)).
93 1d. at 38.
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V. SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR A BANKRUPTCY COURT TO ISSUE A
WARRANT TO SEARCH A DEBTOR'S RESIDENCE
The existing case law in this area of bankruptcy jurisprudence is less than
satisfactory for two reasons. First, the two courts that have issued a search
warrant to a trustee have failed to articulate their source of authority for such an
order. Second, the courts declining to issue a search warrant either question a
bankruptcy court's ability to do so 94 or improperly rely upon Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as the applicable source of authority to act.
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribes that the
federal criminal procedure rules provide the substantial method of procedure "in
all criminal proceedings" in the courts of the United States.95 As such, the
issuance of a search warrant under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure is necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. 96 Because a
bankruptcy proceeding is civil in nature,97 the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure have no applicability, despite the reliance upon Rule 41 by the courts
in Truck-A- Way, Skinner, and In re Trustee in Bankruptcy for Search Warrant
to Undercover Property of Estate Held in Violation of 18 US. C. § 152.98
Furthermore, a bankruptcy trustee does not fall under the ambit of Rule 41
as an individual authorized to seek a warrant because a trustee is neither a
federal law enforcement officer nor an attorney for the government. 99 The vast
majority of Chapter 7 trustees are accountants or attorneys engaged in private
practice.100 In addition, Rule 41(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that a search warrant may be issued to uncover either "evidence of a
crime," "contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed,"
94 d. (noting strong disagreement with the Barman court's interpretation of its
authority to act under the Fourth Amendment).
9'FED R. CiuM. P. l(a)(1); Harrison v. United States, 191 F.2d 874, 875 (5th Cir.
1951).96 Amoco Tex. Ref. Co., No. H 80 79M, 1980 WL 29277, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June 13,
1980) ("The issuance of a search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
must necessarily be limited to criminal proceedings.").97 See Nat'l City Bank v. Flowers (In re Flowers), 83 BR. 953, 954 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1988) ("A bankruptcy proceeding is civil in nature.").98 Cf In re Farrar, CV. No. 07-00019 DAE-KSC, 2007 WL 601985, at *1 (D. Haw.
Feb. 21, 2007) (noting that civil equitable proceedings do not permit reliance upon the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); James W. Fox, Jr., The Road Not Taken: Criminal
Contempt Sanctions and Grand Jury Press Leaks, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 505, 516-17
(1992) ("The choice between designating a contempt action as civil or criminal determines
the procedural rules that govern the action. Civil contempt actions operate under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, while the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure govern criminal
contempt proceedings.").
99 See United States v. McKeever, 905 F.2d 829, 833 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that Rule
41 only applies to warrants issued at the request of federal officers).
100 Sousa, supra note 5, at 380-81 n.96 ("The trustee is an attorney, as are most other
Chapter 7 panel trustees." (citing In re Computer Learning Ctrs., Inc., 285 B.R. 191, 230
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002))).
2012]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
"property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime" or
in order to arrest a person.1 1 Presumably, a bankruptcy trustee would seek to
secure a search warrant for a debtor's home in order to uncover undisclosed
assets belonging to the bankruptcy estate and potentially distributable to
creditors in the course of administering the bankruptcy proceeding.
Consequently, the purpose for which a search warrant is sought in the
bankruptcy arena does not comport with the intended uses provided for by Rule
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
However, complicating the observation that Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure does not apply to bankruptcy trustees is the fact that the
intentional concealment of assets from the bankruptcy proceeding is at the same
time both a civil violation of the Bankruptcy Code as well as a bankruptcy
crime under federal law.' 0 2 Under § 727(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, the
10 1 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c).
102 See Mary Jo Heston, The United States Trustee: The Missing Link of Bankruptcy
Crime Prosecutions, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 359, 364 (1998) ("Civil fraud associated
with bankruptcy cases often involves conduct that violates the related criminal provisions
governing bankruptcy fraud."); see also Duggins v. Heffron, 128 F.2d 546, 548 (9th Cir.
1942) ("Not only was there this concealment in the year prior to the bankruptcy, but the
bankrupt failed to state his equitable ownership in his schedules. Such an omission in the
schedules constituting concealment may also constitute a false oath, both punishable by
imprisonment under the Bankruptcy Act, if the omission is false and intentional." (footnote
omitted)). The federal bankruptcy crimes are contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 152-157 (2006).
Most relevant for present purposes is 18 U.S.C. § 152, which provides as follows:
A person who-
(1) knowingly and fraudulently conceals from a custodian, trustee, marshal, or
other officer of the court charged with the control or custody of property, or, in
connection with a case under title 11, from creditors or the United States Trustee,
any property belonging to the estate of a debtor;
(2) knowingly and fraudulently makes a false oath or account in or in relation to
any case under title 11;
(3) knowingly and fraudulently makes a false declaration, certificate, verification,
or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, in
or in relation to any case under title 11;
(4) knowingly and fraudulently presents any false claim for proof against the estate
of a debtor, or uses any such claim in any case under title 11, in a personal capacity
or as or through an agent, proxy, or attorney;
(5) knowingly and fraudulently receives any material amount of property from a
debtor after the filing of a case under title 11, with intent to defeat the provisions of
title 11;
(6) knowingly and fraudulently gives, offers, receives, or attempts to obtain any
money or property, remuneration, compensation, reward, advantage, or promise
thereof for acting or forbearing to act in any case under title 11;
(7) in a personal capacity or as an agent or officer of any person or corporation, in
contemplation of a case under title 11 by or against the person or any other person
or corporation, or with intent to defeat the provisions of title 11, knowingly and
fraudulently transfers or conceals any of his property or the property of such other
person or corporation;
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discharge of a Chapter 7 debtor may be withheld if the debtor intentionally
conceals property from creditors either within the one-year period preceding
bankruptcy or at some time after the petition is filed. 10 3 At the same time, a
debtor commits a bankruptcy crime under 18 U.S.C. § 152 if he or she
"knowingly and fraudulently" conceals from a trustee "any property belonging
to the estate of a debtor."' 104 If found guilty of criminal concealment, a debtor is
subject to fines or imprisonment. 105 Nonetheless, the potential for such conduct
to constitute a crime would not invalidate the propriety of a civil search,
because the Supreme Court has held that a valid administrative search will not
be subsequently found unconstitutional simply because the search may uncover
violations of both civil and criminal laws.10 6
The statutory duties of a bankruptcy trustee are enumerated in §§ 704 and
1302 of the Bankruptcy Code. 10 7 In general, a bankruptcy trustee gathers and
(8) after the filing of a case under title 11 or in contemplation thereof, knowingly
and fraudulently conceals, destroys, mutilates, falsifies, or makes a false entry in
any recorded information (including books, documents, records, and papers)
relating to the property or financial affairs of a debtor; or
(9) after the filing of a case under title 11, knowingly and fraudulently withholds
from a custodian, trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court or a United States
Trustee entitled to its possession, any recorded information (including books,
documents, records, and papers) relating to the property or financial affairs of a
debtor,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 152 (2006). For a discussion of federal bankruptcy crimes, see generally Heston,
supra, at 359, Tamara Ogier & Jack F. Williams, Bankruptcy Crimes and Bankruptcy
Practice, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 317 (1998), and Maureen A. Tighe, A Guide to
Making a Criminal Bankruptcy Fraud Referral, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 409 (1998).
103 Section 727(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides as follows:
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless-
(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the
estate charged with custody of property under this title, has transferred, removed,
destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted to be transferred, removed,
destroyed, mutilated, or concealed-
(A) property of the debtor, within-one year before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of the petition ....
II U.S.C. § 727(a)(2).
104 18 id § 152(1).
1051d. § 152.
106 Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee's DNA a Valid Special Needs Search Under
the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, J.L. MED. &
ETHICs, Spring 2005, at 102, 117 (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712 (1987)).
107 In a Chapter 7 case, a bankruptcy trustee is responsible for the following actions:
(a) The trustee shall-
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liquidates the property of the estate distributable to creditors, ensures that the
debtor performs her statutory obligations, and investigates the financial affairs
of the debtor. 10 8 And while a private bankruptcy trustee is charged with
ensuring compliance with the Bankruptcy Code, she is not charged with the
responsibility of investigating the possible commission of bankruptcy crimes by
debtors. 10 9 Rather, when it appears that a debtor is abusing the bankruptcy
system, a trustee must either make a referral to the U.S. Trustee or to the
regional office of the U.S. Attorney.1 10
Indeed, 18 U.S.C. § 3057(a) specifically contemplates that if a trustee has
"reasonable grounds" for believing that a bankruptcy crime under 18 U.S.C.
§ 152 has been committed and that an investigation is warranted, the trustee
"shall report to the appropriate United States attorney all the facts and
(1) collect and reduce to money the property of the estate for which such trustee
serves, and close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best
interests of parties in interest;
(2) be accountable for all property received;
(3) ensure that the debtor shall perform his intention as specified in section
52 1(a)(2)(B) of this title;
(4) investigate the financial affairs of the debtor;
(5) if a purpose would be served, examine proofs of claims and object to the
allowance of any claim that is improper;
(6) if advisable, oppose the discharge of the debtor;
(7) unless the court orders otherwise, furnish such information concerning the
estate and the estate's administration as is requested by a party in interest;
(8) if the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated, file with the court,
with the United States trustee, and with any governmental unit charged with
responsibility for collection or determination of any tax arising out of such
operation, periodic reports and summaries of the operation of such business,
including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as
the United States trustee or the court requires; [and]
(9) make a final report and file a final account of the administration of the estate
with the court and with the United States trustee ....
11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1)-(9). A Chapter 13 standing trustee has many of the same
responsibilities as her Chapter 7 counterpart. See id § 1302(b)(1) (providing that a Chapter
13 trustee has some of the same duties as a Chapter 7 trustee pursuant to § 704 of the
Bankruptcy Code).
108 Curry v. Castillo (In re Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 2002).
10928 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(F) specifically directs the U.S. Trustee to notify the
appropriate U.S. Attorney of suspected bankruptcy crimes. Id. § 586(a)(3)(F); see also
Heston, supra note 102, at 397 (noting that the U.S. Trustee serves as the "initiator of
criminal referrals").
110 Neil C. Gordon, Federal Crimes: The Trustee's Role, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec./Jan.
2010, at 52, 52 ("Trustees are generally directed by their U.S. Trustee to make referrals to
that office, but in certain districts, the referral is made directly to the U.S. Attorney."); see
also Kirk v. Hendon (In re Heinsohn), 231 B.R. 48, 59 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1999) ("A trustee
has a statutory duty under 18 U.S.C. § 3057 to notify the United States attorney and report
all of the relevant facts and circumstances of the case if he believes that a crime has been
committed or that further investigation is appropriate.").
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circumstances of the case, the names of the witnesses and the offense or
offenses believed to have been committed." '111 If such a referral is made, it is
then incumbent upon the U.S. Attorney's Office, and not the private case
trustee, to investigate the allegations, report to the bankruptcy court, and seek an
indictment, if warranted. 112 Consequently, so long as the private trustee is not
undertaking her own criminal investigation and searching for evidence of the
bankruptcy crime of concealing assets, then Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure should not be relied upon by courts as potential authority to
issue a search warrant to a bankruptcy trustee. The inapplicability of Rule 41 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not render the issuance of a
warrant by a bankruptcy court impossible, because Rule 41(a) specifically
contemplates that Rule 41 "does not modify any statute regulating search or
seizure" or control "the issuance and execution of a search warrant in special
circumstances."1 13 In other words, to the extent a search warrant can be issued
pursuant to another source of authority, Rule 41(a) serves to preserve, and not
supersede, this secondary procedure.
If Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not provide the
requisite authority for a trustee to seek a search warrant in the civil bankruptcy
context, the question remains whether any source does in fact permit such a
remedy. Because at present the Bankruptcy Code does not statutorily authorize
a search of a debtor's home, resort to another federal statute is necessary. In this
regard, it is possible that a bankruptcy court may issue a search warrant by
relying upon the Federal All Writs Act or § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.
A. The Federal All Writs Act as a Source of Statutory Authority
The Federal All Writs Act, codified by 28 U.S.C. § 1651, provides as
follows: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."'114 Section 14 of the
111 18 U.S.C. § 3057(a).
112 See id § 3057(b) ("The United States attorney thereupon shall inquire into the facts
and report thereon to the judge, and if it appears probable that any such offense has been
committed, shall without delay, present the matter to the grand jury, unless upon inquiry and
examination he decides that the ends of public justice do not require investigation or
prosecution, in which case he shall report the facts to the Attorney General for his
direction.").
113FED. R. CRIM P. 41(a). It has been held that Rule 41(a) "preserves all statutory
provisions permitting searches in specific situations not otherwise explicitly set forth in the
rule." Amoco Oil Co. v. Marshall, 496 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (citing
Marshall v. Huffhines Steel Co., 478 F. Supp. 986, 989 (N.D. Tex. 1979)); cf Gooding v.
United States, 416 U.S. 430, 439 (1974) (holding that Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not applicable to searches governed by specific narcotics search
statutes).
11428 U.S.C. § 1651(a). "The statutory ancestors of§ 1651(a) are sections 13 and 14 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 ... " Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction and the
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Judiciary Act of 1789, the direct historical ancestor to the All Writs Act, has
been described as the "most expansive and open-ended" provision of the
Judiciary Act itself.115 As understood by Professor Wythe Holt, writs issued
pursuant to Section 14 of the Judiciary Act could be employed to address
matters of "great moment," since the writs were often "broad and relatively
open-ended."1 6 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the All Writs Act allows
a federal court to "'avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance
of its duties, when the use of such historic aids is calculated in its sound
judgment to achieve the ends ofjustice entrusted to it. ' " '17 Indeed, the All Writs
Act serves as a "legislatively approved source of procedural instruments
designed to achieve 'the rational ends of law." '118 As contemplated by the
Supreme Court, the All Writs Act enables courts to "fashion extraordinary
remedies when the need arises."' 19 Lower federal courts interpret the All Writs
Act as providing them with "wide latitude ... to construct any remedy
necessary to 'achieve justice.'" 20
However, the power of a court to issue an order under the All Writs Act is
not without limitation. As interpreted today, the All Writs Act does not create
any substantive federal jurisdiction. 12 Rather, the All Writs Act enables courts
to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction already acquired on some other independent
basis. 122 Once jurisdiction is vested in a federal court on an independent basis,
All Writs Act, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 401, 433 (1999). Sections 13 and 14 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 were subsequently consolidated into the All Writs Act in 1948. Fruqan Mouzon,
Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L.
REv. 1, 15 n.50 (2008). Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided in relevant part that
the Supreme Court shall have the "power to issue writs of prohibition ... [or] mandamus in
cases warranted by the principles and usages of law." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1
Stat. 73, 80-81 (footnote omitted). in turn, Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided
as follows: "[A]ll the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall have power to issue
writs of scirefacias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute,
which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to
the principles and usages of law." Id. § 14, 1 Stat. at 81-82 (footnote omitted). For a
historical account of the enactment of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, see generally
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 49 (1923).
115 Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice ": Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1507.l161d
"
11 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 173 (1977) (quoting Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942)).
118 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 282 (1942) (citation omitted); see also N.Y Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. at 172 (stating same).
119 Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985).
120 United States v. Javanmard, 767 F. Supp. 1109, 1111 (D. Kan. 1991).
121 Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1099 (11 th Cir. 2004).
122 Brittingham v. Comm'r, 451 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Telecomms.
Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding same); United
States v. Hall, 583 F. Supp. 717, 718 (E.D. Va. 1984) ("The statute is in no way
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however, the All Writs Act "empowers that court to enter such orders as it
deems necessary, in its discretion, to preserve and protect its jurisdiction."']23
The All Writs Act is a "residual source of authority" for courts to issue writs
that are not otherwise provided for by another statute. 124 Where a statute
specifically addresses the particular issue under consideration by a court, it is
this other statute, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling. 125 Accordingly,
the All Writs Act serves as a gap filler to existing law where the latter is silent
on the specific issue before the court. 126 Finally, the All Writs Act does not
authorize courts to issue ad hoc writs to circumvent otherwise applicable, but
perhaps more burdensome, statutory procedures. 127
The purpose and function of the All Writs Act is to supply the federal courts
with the mechanisms and instruments needed to perform their duty, as
prescribed by Congress and the Constitution. 128 That said, however, it has been
noted that "the Supreme Court's efforts to construe the All Writs Act have
failed to define clearly the Act's grant of power."' 29 Nevertheless, certain
prerequisites must exist before a court will issue an order under the All Writs
Act. 130 First, there must be "an absence of alternative remedies.' 131 If the matter
jurisdictional; it neither enlarges nor expands jurisdiction of the court; it may be invoked
only to aid jurisdiction which the Court already has.").
123 In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. N.Y Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 172.
124 Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 43.125 Id
126 Dimitri D. Portnoi, Note, Resorting to Extraordinary Writs: How the All Writs Act
Rises to Fill the Gaps in the Rights of Enemy Combatants, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 293, 298
(2008).
12 7 Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 43 ("Although [the All Writs] Act empowers
federal courts to fashion extraordinary remedies when the need arises, it does not authorize
them to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory procedures appears
inconvenient or less appropriate.").
128 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969).
129 Daniel J. Wacker, The "Unreviewable" Court-Martial Conviction: Supervisory
Relief Under the All Writs Act from the United States Court of Military Appeals, 10 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 33, 58 (1975).130 Notably, the issuance of an injunction under the All Writs Act need not comply with
the requirements for a traditional injunction. Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d
1092, 1100 (11th Cir. 2004); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aventura Eng'g & Constr. Corp., 534
F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2008) ("When considering whether to grant an All Writs
Injunction, the [c]ourt does not review the four factors required for a traditional
injunction."). The requirements for a traditional injunction generally are as follows:
(1) the likelihood of the moving party's success on the merits; (2) the possibility of
irreparable injury to the moving party if relief is not granted; (3) the extent to which the
balance of hardships favors the respective parties; and (4) in certain cases, whether the
public interest will be advanced by granting the preliminary relief.
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Swift Transp. Co., 367 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir.
2004) (quoting Miller ex rel. NLRB v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 456 (9th Cir. 1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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before the court is addressed in a particular statute, then the All Writs Act has
no place.132 Second, as noted above, because the All Writs Act does not confer
jurisdiction upon a federal court, there must exist "an independent basis for
jurisdiction" prior to any reliance upon the All Writs Act.133 Third, an order
must be exercised only "in aid of' a federal court's jurisdiction. 134 While this
language is not defined by the statute, courts have construed it to mean that the
offending behavior, if left unchecked, would undermine or be detrimental to the
court's independent jurisdiction over the pending matter 135 or inhibit a court's
efforts to manage a case to judgment. 136 As a corollary to this notion, the All
Writs Act has been utilized by federal courts in issuing orders appropriate to
assist them in undertaking factual inquiries.1 37 Fourth, an order entered under
the All Writs Act must be "agreeable to the usages and principles of law.' 138
This provision is also undefined by the Act; however, at least one court has
interpreted this language to mean that any order under the Act must not offend
established principles relative to the particular writ sought. 139
Bankruptcy courts are "courts established by Act of Congress"'140 and, thus,
have the ability to utilize the All Writs Act in fashioning appropriate orders. 141
131 Portnoi, supra note 126, at 299.
13 2 Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 43; see also Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529,
537 (1999) ("The All Writs Act invests a court with a power essentially equitable and, as
such, not generally available to provide alternatives to other, adequate remedies at law."
(citing Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996))).133 Portnoi, supra note 126, at 301.
1341d. at 302.
13 5K/ay, 376 F.3d at 1110; ITT Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th
Cir. 1978); ef Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 41 ("Our early view of the scope of the all
writs provision confined it to filling the interstices of federal judicial power when those gaps
threatened to thwart the otherwise proper exercise of federal courts' jurisdiction.").
136 ITT Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 457 F. Supp. 224, 232 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
137 See, e.g., Am. Lithographic Co. v. Werckmeister, 221 U.S. 603, 609 (1911)
(subpoenas duces tecum); Bethlehem Shipbuilding. Corp. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 126, 127 (1st
Cir. 1941) (ordering that certain documents be produced for the purpose of pretrial
discovery).
13828 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2006).
139 Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Civic Ctr. Theatre, Inc., 333 F.2d 358, 360 (10th
Cir. 1964).
140 Goodman v. Cal. Portland Cement Co. (In re GTI Capital Holdings, LLC), 420 B.R.
1, 11 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009).
141 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 594 F.2d 952, 957 (3d Cir. 1979)
(recognizing the ability of a bankruptcy court to rely upon the Federal All Writs Act).
Congress created bankruptcy courts under Title 28 of the U.S. Code. In essence, bankruptcy
courts constitute "units" or "adjuncts" of the corresponding district courts. King v. Florida
(In re King), 280 B.R. 767, 777 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002). In particular, 28 U.S.C. § 151
provides as follows:
In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular active service shall constitute a
unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court for that district. Each
bankruptcy judge, as a judicial officer of the district court, may exercise the authority
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Bankruptcy courts have relied upon the All Writs Act as a source of authority to
issue orders in several different circumstances, including: (1) restricting the
filing of vexatious cases or pleadings; 142 (2) precluding the initiation of any
lawsuits by defendants in an adversary proceeding against the debtors or their
post-confirmation trust; 143 and (3) staying payments to beneficiaries from a
personal injury settlement trust. 144 To date, no reported decision has
contemplated the use of the All Writs Act as a source of authority for a
bankruptcy court to issue an order to search a debtor's home upon suspicion of
concealing assets. But this absence does not mean that a federal court is lacking
such authority.
The prerequisites for the issuance of an order under the All Writs Act are
met in the context of a bankruptcy trustee seeking an administrative search
order for a debtor's home in carrying out her duty to investigate the financial
affairs of a debtor. Because the Bankruptcy Code does not currently provide for
the issuance of an administrative search warrant and Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41 does not apply in the bankruptcy context, an alternative remedy
does not exist whereby a trustee can obtain relief to search a debtor's home
upon adequate suspicion of fraud. Furthermore, a bankruptcy trustee would not
be relying upon the All Writs Act to confer jurisdiction upon the bankruptcy
court. Jurisdiction would already be conferred upon the court by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334145 and 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). 146 The failure to issue an administrative
search order upon suspicion of debtor fraud undermines both the integrity of the
bankruptcy process itself and the obligation of debtors to be fully forthcoming
in their disclosures to the court, in exchange for the benefits conferred by
bankruptcy law, most notably the discharge of pre-petition debt. 147 In terms of
the All Writs Act, "the jurisdiction being 'aided' here is that of the bankruptcy
court and its administration and protection of the bankruptcy estate." 148 The
conferred under this chapter with respect to any action, suit, or proceeding and may
preside alone and hold a regular or special session of the court, except as otherwise
provided by law or by rule or order of the district court.
28 U.S.C. § 151.142 Armstrong v. Rushton (In re Armstrong), 309 B.R. 799, 805, 807-10 (B.A.P. 10th
Cir. 2004); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Butler, 58 B.R. 1019, 1022 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Stanwyck v. Bogen (In re Stanwyck), 450 B.R. 181, 200, 206 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2011); Goodman, 420 B.R. at 11-12, 15-16.
143 Post-Confirmation Trust v. Berry (In re Fleming Cos.), 444 B.R. 127, 136 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2011).144 Findley v. Laughead (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 27 F.3d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1994).
145 Section 1334(a) of 28 U.S.C. confers original jurisdiction in the district courts over
all bankruptcy cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).
146 Section 157(a) of 28 U.S.C. provides that the district courts may refer all bankruptcy
cases and related proceedings to the bankruptcy courts. Id. § 157(a).
147 Roudebush v. Sharp (In re Sharp), 244 B.R. 889, 891 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
14 8 See Post-Confirmation Trust, 444 B.R. at 138 (noting that the issuance of an
injunction by the bankruptcy court under the All Writs Act to prevent suits against the
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most complex aspect of applying the All Writs Act to authorize a search of a
debtor's home is with the statute's requirement that any order be "agreeable to
the usages and principles of law."' 149 Although this standard remains undefined,
it is reasonable to presume that any search order issued pursuant to the All
Writs Act should comply with established principles in a related area of law,
namely Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution applies in both the
criminal and civil contexts. 150 Consequently, any search of a debtor's home
must comply with Fourth Amendment principles, even though Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41 does not apply in the bankruptcy arena. Historically, the
indiscriminate and suspicionless searches and seizures carried out by British
officials under the authority of the infamous writs of assistance "were the
immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth
Amendment.' 151 Because the execution of the writs of assistance enabled
British officials to search an individual's home without restraint, the concern for
privacy in the home has been described as "the root of the Fourth Amendment
itself."'1 52 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently recognized a special
debtors or their post-confirmation trust would serve to protect the estate and its continued
administration).
14928 U.S.C. § 1651.
150 Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 67 (1992); see also McCabe v. Life-Line
Ambulance Serv., Inc., 77 F.3d 540, 544 (1st Cir. 1996) ("The Fourth Amendment applies
not only to governmental searches and seizures in criminal investigations, but also in various
civil proceedings."). "The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect citizens against
unnecessary intrusions into their privacy." United States v. Hanon, 428 F.2d 101, 104 (8th
Cir. 1970) (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967)).
151 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 482 (1976) ("The Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associated with the
use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies .... );
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 641 (1886) (Miller, J., concurring) ("While the framers
of the Constitution had their attention drawn, no doubt, to the abuses of this power of
searching private houses and seizing private papers, as practiced in England, it is obvious
that they only intended to restrain the abuse, while they did not abolish the power."). For a
detailed historical account of the writs of assistance and the resistance thereto by the
American colonists, see generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and
the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Writs of
Assistance], Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757
(1994), Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Concept of Reasonableness, 2004
UTAH L. REV. 977, Geoffrey G. Hemphill, The Administrative Search Doctrine: Isn't This
Exactly What the Framers Were Trying to Avoid?, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 215 (1995), Tracey
Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment. A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV.
925 (1997) [hereinafter Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment], Tracey Maclin,
Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History
Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895 (2002) [hereinafter Macl', Let Sleeping Dogs Lie], and
David E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56
FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2004).
152 Craig M. Bradley, "Knock and Talk" and the Fourth Amendment, 84 IND. L.J. 1099,
1101 (2009). As Professor Tracey Maclin explains:
[Vol. 73:1
PREVENTING BANKRUPTCYFRA UD
privacy protection for intrusions into the home. 153 The Court in Payton v. New
York expressed this sentiment in unmistakable terms: "The Fourth Amendment
protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of
privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual's home ... ,, 14
Given the traditional protection against governmental intrusions into the
home, a warrantless search of a residence is presumptively unreasonable unless
some limited exception applies.' 55 Many of these exceptions, such as police
rendering emergency aid, 156 pursuing a fleeing felon, 157 or preventing the
destruction of evidence 158 obviously do not apply in the bankruptcy context.
More particularly in the administrative context, a warrantless search of a
residence has been upheld only in the case of exigent circumstances 159 or
"special needs," whereby a government intrusion serves needs beyond those of
normal law enforcement and crime detection. 160 To date, the "special needs"
Protecting the security of private homes was certainly a priority for the Framers. Indeed,
one could say that the Framers were particularly sensitive about safeguarding private
homes from governmental intrusion, as the constitutional privilege against unreasonable
search and seizure "arose from the harsh experience of householders having their doors
hammered open by magistrates and writ-bearing agents of the crown. Indeed, the Fourth
Amendment is explainable only by the history and memory of such abuse." The
intrusions that the colonists experienced at the hands of British customs officers "had
done violence to the ancient maxim that 'A man's house is his castle."'
Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie, supra note 151, at 933 (footnote omitted).
153 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 884 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
154 Payton, 445 U.S. at 589; see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001);
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("The Fourth Amendment, and the
personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very core stands the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion."). In order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment against unwarranted
intrusions, an individual must satisfy the two-part test enunciated by Justice Harlan in Katz
v. United States. First, the individual must exhibit an actual subjective expectation of
privacy, and second, this expectation of privacy must be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
155 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011); see also Donovan v. Dewey, 452
U.S. 594, 598 (1981) (noting that searches of private homes generally must be conducted
pursuant to a warrant); United States v. Harrison, 639 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2011) ("A
warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable .. "); Lesser v. Espy, 34 F.3d
1301, 1305 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that a search of a private residence generally must be
conducted pursuant to a warrant in order to be reasonable (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 586)).
156 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
157 United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976).
15 8 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).
15 9 Anobile v. Pelligrino, 303 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2002).
160 For articles addressing the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment, see
generally Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil
Searches in the Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 1223 (2004); George M. Dery
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doctrine has been limited to administrative residence searches of probationers or
parolees. 161 As recognized by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York in United States v. Kone, warrantless searches of probationers'
and parolees' homes have been approved by the Supreme Court "in situations
where a governing statute, regulation, or condition of parole authorized the
warrantless search."' 162 The doctrine has never been applied to the bankruptcy
context, and as previously noted, the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize or
contemplate a search of a debtor's home. Thus, despite my contentions in a
prior article that the special needs exception can apply in bankruptcy, 163 it is
uncertain whether a court would ever accept such a departure from the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement.
Ultimately, a bankruptcy trustee's conduct must be reasonable in order to
comply with the Fourth Amendment.164 The reasonableness of the search will
be determined by balancing the degree to which it intrudes upon the
individual's privacy against the degree to which the search is needed to promote
legitimate governmental interests. 165 As a result of the heightened protection
afforded to the home under the Fourth Amendment, a bankruptcy trustee would
need to seek a search order from the court prior to conducting any search for
undisclosed assets. 166 Because a search order issued pursuant to the All Writs
Act must not offend the Fourth Amendment, some protections in obtaining a
search warrant should carry over into the bankruptcy context. That is, any
III, Are Politicians More Deserving of Privacy than Schoolchildren? How Chandler v.
Miller Exposed the Absurdities of Fourth Amendment "Special Needs" Balancing, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 73 (1998); Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale: Creating a Chasm in
Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 89 (1992); Sousa, supra note 5;
Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, "Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception
Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 529 (1997).
161 See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006) (search of a parolee's
residence); Griffm v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (search of probationer's
home).
162 United States v. Kone, 591 F. Supp. 2d 593, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
163 See Sousa, supra note 5, at 367.
164 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)); see also Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967)
(noting that reasonableness is the "ultimate standard" under the Fourth Amendment).
165United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001); see also Bd. of Educ. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) ("It is true that we generally determine the reasonableness
of a search by balancing the nature of the intrusion on the individual's privacy against the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests." (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
654 (1979))); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ("[F]or there is 'no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search ... against the
invasion which the search ... entails."' (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37)).
166 Searches conducted pursuant to a valid warrant are presumptively reasonable;
however, the execution of the search must still be reasonable. United States v. Goldenberg,
No. 05 CR. 1034(DC), 2006 WL 266564, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2006).
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search order should be issued by a neutral and detached bankruptcy judge. 167
The application for a search order may be made ex parte to the court, 168 but
only under circumstances where the trustee has reasonable grounds to believe
that the debtor is actively concealing assets in the home and would likely
dispose of the assets if prior notice is provided.' 69 Though a showing of
probable cause is not specifically required to obtain a warrant in the civil
context, 170 the bankruptcy trustee still must present the facts leading to her
reasonable suspicion that the debtor is concealing assets from the bankruptcy
estate, along with the necessity for conducting the search. Further, any
inspection should be limited to regular business hours, conducted in the debtor's
presence, and without forcible entry.171
Unlike the traditional warrant application, however, the trustee need not
unmistakably identify in the application for the search order the specific items
of property to be uncovered in the debtor's residence. As the court in Barman
observed, placing such a restriction upon a bankruptcy trustee "unduly
compromise[s] the trustee's ability to carry out his statutory obligations" to
investigate the financial affairs of the debtor. 172 Unless items of property are
voluntarily disclosed by a debtor on the bankruptcy petition and schedules, a
167 Cf Edmondson v. United States, 402 F.2d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1968) (applying the
"neutral and detached" standard in the criminal law context (citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108, 111 (1964))).
16 8 See David Sparks, Note, Searches by Environmental Protection Agencies: When Is a
Warrant Necessary?, 10 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 143, 148 (1995) (noting that
administrative warrants may be obtained on an ex parte basis).
169As one commentator has correctly recognized, the element of surprise is of crucial
importance in the bankruptcy context. Brandy L. Kuretich, Comment, Bankruptcy and the
Fourth Amendment: Should the Test Be "Reasonable" or "Administrative?," 81 U. DET.
MERCY L. REv. 31, 53 (2003). That is, "[i]f the debtor has warning that the trustee is coming
to conduct an inventory of the assets stored at his residence, he will have an opportunity to
transfer those hidden assets to another location and further hinder or delay the Trustee's
ability to uncover assets for the benefit of creditors." Id.17 0Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667-68 (1989) ("Our cases
teach, however, that the probable-cause standard 'is peculiarly related to criminal
investigations.' In particular, the traditional probable-cause standard may be unhelpful in
analyzing the reasonableness of routine administrative functions .... " (citations omitted));
see also United States v. Roux Labs., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 973, 977 (M.D. Fla. 1978) ("To be
sure, the administrative inspection search is of a different character than a criminal search.
The kind of showing of probable cause for an administrative search warrant is different
because it varies from one situational context to another, unlike the single standard of
probable cause needed to obtain a criminal search warrant." (footnote omitted) (citing
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978))); cf Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868, 873 (1987) (noting that in the administrative context, a warrant need not be obtained
upon a showing of probable cause so long as the search meets "reasonable legislative or
administrative standards" (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 538)); Montville v. Lewis, 87 F.3d
900, 903 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding same).
171 Indeed, the Barman court utilized such parameters. See Taunt v. Barman (In re
Barman), 252 B.R. 403, 418 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
172Id. at 419.
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trustee has no way of knowing what property the debtor may be possessing
behind the concrete walls of her residence. Consequently, requiring a trustee to
itemize with specificity the property believed to be on the premises only serves
to "reward the dishonest or sloppy debtor."'173
While not in the bankruptcy context, a search order issued pursuant to the
All Writs Act has been approved indirectly by at least two different courts. In
United States v. Goodridge, the federal government filed a motion under the All
Writs Act seeking an order compelling two individuals to provide blood
samples for blood type and DNA testing. 174 The purpose of the request was to
help assist the government in identifying whose blood was uncovered in a
getaway car used in a bank robbery.' 75 The individuals did not contest that the
All Writs Act could provide the court with the power to issue the order, and the
court did not question whether such an order could emanate from the All Writs
Act. 176 Rather, the individuals argued that the government's request amounted
to a search for evidence which must first be measured by the Fourth
Amendment. 177 The district court agreed with this argument, requiring that the
government demonstrate "search warrant standards" prior to any issuance of a
search order under the All Writs Act. 178
In United States v. Kone,179 Falikou Kone was "serving a federal term of
supervised release, but no statute, special condition of release, or regulation
authorized a warrantless search of his home." 180 While on supervised release,
the U.S. Probation Office suspected Kone of manufacturing and possessing
fraudulent checks.1 81 Consequently, the Probation Office filed an affidavit with
the district court requesting that a search order be issued for Kone's residence
and automobiles.' 82 Recognizing that officials from the Probation Office are not
considered law enforcement officers within the meaning of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41,183 the Probation Office sought the search order under
the All Writs Act.184 The district court granted the search order.185 Following
the execution of the order, Kone moved to suppress evidence uncovered in his
home and challenged the order under the Fourth Amendment. 186 In measuring
the order against the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that the
government needed to obtain a search warrant prior to conducting any search of
173 Id.
174 United States v. Goodridge, 945 F. Supp. 371, 372 (D. Mass. 1996).
17 5 Id.
176Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 373.
179 591 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
18°Id. at 597.
181 Id.
182Id
183Id. at 599.
184Id. at 598.
185 Kone, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 598.
186Id. at 597.
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Kone's home. 187 The court, however, held that the search order failed to comply
with the Fourth Amendment because it did not issue upon a finding of probable
cause. 188 Significantly, though, the court did not strike down the propriety of a
court issuing a search order under the All Writs Act. Rather, the order proved
defective because it failed to issue upon a finding of probable cause, as would a
more traditional search warrant under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41.189
It is reasonable to presume that a search order can be issued under the
authority of the All Writs Act. But as previously conceded, the use of the All
Writs Act to order a search of a debtor's home is not without criticism. 190 The
Supreme Court's reference to "historic aids," namely common law writs, 191 in
United States v. New York Telephone Co., 192 along with the fact that the All
Writs Act imbues federal courts with essentially equitable powers, 193 raises the
question of whether an order to search a home was a remedy available at
common law 194 or in equity. 195 As the Supreme Court concluded in Grupo
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,196 the equity
jurisdiction of the federal courts extends only so far as the equity jurisprudence
exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts
187 1d. at 608.
1881d
"
189 Id. at 610.
190 See supra Part IV.
191 Some of the traditional common law writs included writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, injunction, subpoena, habeas corpus, ne exeat and coram nobis. Wacker, supra
note 129, at 52 n.94.
192434 U.S. 159, 173, 187 (1977).
193 William P. Glenn, Jr., Ex-Parte Seizure of Intellectual Property Goods, 9 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 307, 318 (2001).
194Brian M. Hoffstadt, Common-Law Writs and Federal Common Lawmaking on
Collateral Review, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1413, 1461 (2002) ("Because the [All Writs] Act
is... broadly worded, the courts have necessarily resorted to the common law to determine
which writs are available, and under which circumstances they may be issued."); Fruqan
Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement Legislation, 39 U.
MEM. L. REV. 1, 18 (2008) ("To give some contours to the exercise of their discretion, when
justice so requires, federal courts may, under the All Writs Act, use the historic common law
writs.").
195 See ITT Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting
that the All Writs Act "provide[s] a federal court with various common law equity devices to
be used incidental to the authority conferred on the court"); see also Alan M. Ahart,
Preliminary Asset Freezes in the Bankruptcy Courts, 28 CAL. BANKR. J. 125, 133 (2006)
(arguing that in accordance with Supreme Court precedent, the All Writs Act does not confer
any authority on a federal court "beyond the general equitable power of a federal district
court").
196 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
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over all suits in equity. 197 Consequently, it must be examined whether a
traditional court of equity could order the search of a debtor's home or whether
such a remedy could only be fashioned by a common law court. 198 If courts of
equity were unable to do so, then a similar restraint might be placed on a
modem bankruptcy court relying upon the All Writs Act as its source of
authority.
Historically, courts of equity administered remedies for rights not
recognized by common law courts or for the prevention of wrongs for which the
common law did not provide an adequate remedy. 199 The power of English
courts of equity to fashion appropriate remedies has been described as
"extraordinary jurisdiction." 200 The matters in which equity could operate
included, among others, protecting trusts and equitable estates, correcting
injuries arising by accident or mistake, preventing unconscionable bargains,
enforcing action for creditors utilizing setoff or marshaling, or compelling the
performance of a duty the commission of which would inflict irreparable injury
on a person.201 To effectuate its ruling, courts of equity would issue writs or
bills upon affected parties.202 With respect to creditor-debtor relations,
traditional writs or bills in equity included writs of ne exeat republica,20 3
creditor bills of discovery,20 4 writs of execution,20 5 and writs of injunction.206
197 Id. at 318; see also 3 ROGER FOSTER, A TREATISE ON FEDERAL PRACTICE CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 5 (4th ed. 1909) ("The jurisdiction in equity of the Federal courts is, subject to
the limitations of the Constitution, substantially the same as that of the English Court of
Chancery ... ").
198 See U.S. Alkali Exp. Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 201-02 (1945)
(permitting the use of the common law writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition under
the All Writs Act); see also Hoffstadt, supra note 194, at 1416-17 (2001) (contending that
the All Writs Act enables federal courts to issue common law writs so long as they are
necessary or in aid of the court's jurisdiction).199 FOSTER, supra note 197, § 2.
2 0 0 GEO. TUCKER BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF
JUSTICE ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF CHANCERY 2 (10th ed. 1922).
201 FOSTER, supra note 197, § 2; see also WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, A TREATISE ON
EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE WITH ILLUSTRATIVE FORMS AND PRECEDENTS § 3 (1902).202 See generally 2 FOSTER, supra note 197, § 361 (describing the writ process).
2 0 3 CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., A TREATISE ON THE MODERN PRACTICE IN EQUITY IN THE
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, wITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE
PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS § 607 (Cincinnati, W.H. Anderson & Co 1894). The writ
of ne exeat republica was a prerogative writ that placed a person in custody so as to prevent
her from leaving a particular state or the United States. Id.
204 Elliott v. Kyle, 57 So. 752, 753-54 (Ala. 1912); FLETCHER, supra note 201, at
§§ 804-824.
205 FLETCHER, supra note 201, § 734.
206 Morrow v. Dist. of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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At common law, a court could issue a writ of scire facias207 or a writ of
attachment. 208
There appears to have been no specific writ at equity or common law that
authorized the search of a residence. However, if it is truly the case that the
Supreme Court in Grupo Mexicano requires a reference to English chancery and
common law practice for the scope of a federal court's authority under the All
Writs Act, then one cannot ignore the controversial writ of assistance issued by
courts of equity in England and in the American colonies prior to 1789. In its
modem form, a writ of assistance is akin to a writ of possession at law, whereby
a court orders the transfer of title to and possession of real property based upon
a previously entered decree. 20 9 Historically, a writ of assistance could also be
issued commanding an officer of the court to put a party in possession of
property to which she is entitled. This writ authorized a sheriff to search and
"break open all necessary doors, if the possession be not quietly delivered."210
More significantly, the writ of assistance was often utilized to place property
into the hands of receivers, 2 11 a position that functions akin to today's
bankruptcy trustee.
More generally, the writs of assistance utilized in pre-revolutionary
America were akin to general search warrants "that permitted the authorities to
search anywhere they pleased for any reason--or for no reason."212 This
included searches of homes, oftentimes in search of uncustomed goods.2 13 The
writs of assistance and general warrants were "anathema in the colonies"2 14 and
served in part as a catalyst for the Revolution and for the Fourth Amendment's
207 A writ ofscirefacias issued in favor of a party attempting to enforce or execute upon
a judgment previously obtained. 2 FOSTER, supra note 202, § 368b.
208 Id. § 369. A writ of attachment was used by creditors either to obtain jurisdiction
over a debtor or to sequester property owned by the debtor to satisfy a future judgment.
209 S. State Bank v. Leverette, 123 S.E. 68, 69-70 (N.C. 1924).
2 10 FLETCHER, supra note 201, § 736.
2 1 1 1d. § 736.
212 Thomas K. Clancy, The James Otis Lectures: Annual Lecture Series on Search and
Seizure Principles, 76 Miss. L.J. 581, 581-82 (2006).2 13 Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 151, at 77.
2 14 Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 151, at 945 (citation
omitted). For an in-depth treatment of the history of general warrants and writs of assistance
in the American colonies, see generally id.; Amar, supra note 151; Clancy, supra note 151;
Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers'Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment,
86 IND. L.J. 979 (2011); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197 (1993); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth
Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); M. Blane Michael,
Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief that Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 905 (2010); David E. Steinberg, An Original Misunderstanding: Akhil Amar and
Fourth Amendment History, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 227 (2005); and David E. Steinberg,
High School Drug Testing and the Original Understanding of the Fourth Amendment, 30
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 263 (2003).
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inclusion in the Constitution.215 By all accounts, the Fourth Amendment served
to remedy and prevent writs of assistance and general warrants from issuing in
America after the adoption of the Constitution.216
I am certainly not advocating for a return of the general warrant under the
auspices of the All Writs Act. Instead, I make the observation of the writs of
assistance simply to support an argument that since the authority to order a
search of a home existed in England in the late eighteenth century, then perhaps
the power to order a search can find authority in the All Writs Act despite the
limitations espoused by the Grupo Mexicano Court. Importantly though, any
order to search made pursuant to the All Writs Act would still need to comply
with the mandates of the Fourth Amendment.
B. Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code as a Source ofAuthority to Issue
a Search Warrant
In addition to relying upon the All Writs Act, a bankruptcy court may also
reasonably rely upon § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code as a source of authority to
issue a search order of a debtor's home. Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
provides in relevant part that a bankruptcy court "may issue any order, process,
or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title."217 This provision derives from section 2(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, which in turn takes its origins directly from the Federal All Writs Act.218
2 15 Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law
History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 10 (2007).
2 16 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) ("It is familiar history that
indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 'general warrants'
were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth
Amendment."); Dist. of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ("It is true that
the incident which gave rise to the furor in England and to the fears in this country was the
invention of general warrants designed to accomplish an invasion of homes. And the
adopters of the [Fourth] Amendment certainly intended to forestall any such in this
country.").
217 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).
218 Daniel B. Bogart, Resisting the Expansion of Bankruptcy Court Power Under Section
105 of the Bankruptcy Code: The All Writs Act and an Admonition from Chief Justice
Marshall, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 793, 799 (2003). Section 2(a)(15) of the former Bankruptcy Act
provided as follows:
(a) The courts of the United States hereinbefore defined as courts of bankruptcy are
hereby created courts of bankruptcy and are hereby invested, within their respective
territorial limits as now established or as they may be hereafter changed, with such
jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in
proceedings under this title, in vacation, in chambers, and during their respective terms,
as they are now or may be hereafter held, to-
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Much like the "in aid of jurisdiction" component of the All Writs Act, it has
been held that the original purpose of section 2(a)(15) was to provide a
bankruptcy court with the power to "protect its custody of the estate and the
administration thereof."219 Indeed, the legislative history to § 105 evinces the
connection to the All Writs Act, providing that "[s]ection 105 is similar in effect
to the All Writs Statute .... The section is repeated here for the sake of
continuity from current law and ease of reference, and to cover any powers
traditionally exercised by a bankruptcy court that are not encompassed by the
All Writs Statute."220
Despite its lineage from the All Writs Act, in its modem incantation § 105
has become an "omnibus provision" 221 which serves as the basis for bankruptcy
courts to claim to possess and exercise broad powers in the administration of a
bankruptcy case.222 Despite the well-accepted notion that bankruptcy courts are
courts of equity, and thereby imbued with broad powers to fashion relief in
bankruptcy cases, 223 it is equally understood that a bankruptcy court's power
under § 105 is not boundless. In this regard, the Supreme Court has expressed
that any grant of authority given to the bankruptcy courts pursuant to § 105
must be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.224 That is, a
(15) Make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments, in addition to
those specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the enforcement of the
provisions of this title ....
11 U.S.C. § 1 l(a)(15) (1976) (repealed 1978).
219 Gonzalez Hemandez v. Borgos, 343 F.2d 802, 807 (1 st Cir. 1965).
220 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 316-17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6273-74; see also Bird v. Carl's Grocery Co. (In re NWFX, Inc.), 864 F.2d 593, 595 (8th
Cir. 1989) ("Section 105 is comparable to the All Writs Statute .... ); In re Sauer, 223 B.R.
715, 726 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1998) (noting same).
221 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 105.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
16th ed. 2009).
222 See, e.g., United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990) (noting that
pursuant to § 105(a), "bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have broad authority to modify
creditor-debtor relationships"); Dalton Dev. Project #1 v. Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re
Uni~il), 948 F.2d 678, 682 (10th Cir. 1991) ("The bankruptcy judge has the power to issue
any order which is necessary or appropriate to protect the debtor's estate."); In re Comer
Home Care, Inc., 438 B.R. 122, 126 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2010) ("But it must be recognized
that § 105(a) grants broad equitable powers over the administration of a case and therefore
any decision is well within the discretion of the court."); In re Lucero, 408 B.R. 348, 351
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that a bankruptcy court "has broad statutory authority
under 11 U.S.C. § 105 to fashion suitable relief consistent with bankruptcy's principles of
fairness and equity favoring debtors").
223 Manuel D. Leal, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court: Section 105, 29 S. TEx. L.
REv. 487, 490 (1987) ("There is general agreement that Congress has expressly granted very
broad powers in section 105 to judges exercising federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.").224 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 382 (2007) (citing Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)); cf Raleigh v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 530
U.S. 15, 24-25 (2000) ("Bankruptcy courts are not authorized in the name of equity to make
2012]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
bankruptcy court "may exercise its equitable power only as a means to fulfill
some specific code provision; it may not use its equitable powers to achieve a
result not contemplated by the code." 225 The power bestowed to a bankruptcy
court by § 105 may also not be used to override explicit provisions in other
sections of the Bankruptcy Code.226 Furthermore, a bankruptcy court cannot
invoke § 105(a) to create substantive rights not otherwise provided by the
Bankruptcy Code or "to constitute a roving commission to do equity." 227
At present, the applicable case law and scholarly literature reflect two
divergent schools of thought regarding the breadth of § 105.228 The first school
adopts a liberal interpretation of § 105, thereby enabling a court to fashion relief
and craft remedies in order to fill gaps left by the statutory language of the
Bankruptcy Code.229 Professor Daniel Bogart offers the following examples of
bankruptcy courts utilizing § 105 expansively to issue orders or to take actions
for which the Bankruptcy Code does not specifically provide: (1) ordering the
partial discharge of student loans despite the presumption of § 523(a)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Code230 that none of a debtor's educational student loans are
wholesale substitution of underlying law controlling the validity of creditors' entitlements,
but are limited to what the Bankruptcy Code itself provides.").225 Murgillo v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization (In re Murgillo), 176 B.R. 524, 531
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (citing Norwest, 485 U.S. at 206).
226In re Sec. & Energy Sys., Inc., 62 B.R. 676, 678 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1986).
2271n re First RepublicBank Corp., 95 B.R. 58, 60 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (citing
United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986)); see also In re WAPI, Inc.,
171 B.R. 130, 133 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1994) (noting same).
228 COLLIER, supra note 221, 105.01. For an in-depth treatment on the issue of a
bankruptcy court's power under § 105 in the scholarly literature, see Bogart, supra note 218,
at 805-06; Leal, supra note 223, at 490; Brian Leepson, A Case for the Use of a Broad
Court Equity Power to Facilitate Chapter 11 Reorganization, 12 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
775, 776 (1996); Steve H. Nickles & David G. Epstein, Another Way of Thinking About
Section 105(a) and Other Sources of Supplemental Law Under the Bankruptcy Code, 3
CHAP. L. REv. 7 (2000); see also Smart World Techs., LLC v. Juno Online Servs., Inc. (In re
Smart World Techs., LLC), 423 F.3d 166, 183 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting the disagreement
among circuit courts over how broadly to construe a bankruptcy court's power under § 105).
229COLLIER, supra note 221, 105.01; see also Leepson, supra note 228, at 795-96
(arguing for an expansive interpretation of § 105 in the Chapter 11 context).
230 Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code excepts certain types of debts from an
individual debtor's discharge. In particular, § 523(a)(8) creates a presumption that
educational loans are not dischargeable in bankruptcy absent an individual debtor satisfying
a rigid "undue hardship" standard. Law v. Educ. Res. Inst., Inc. (In re Law), 159 B.R. 287,
291 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1993). Section 523(a)(8) provides as follows:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not
discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose an
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents, for-
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dischargeable; 2 3 1 (2) extending the "automatic stay" to non-debtor third parties,
despite the language of § 362 making the stay applicable only to the debtor and
to the bankruptcy estate;232 (3) permitting the "substantive consolidation" of
two different bankruptcy estates;23 3 (4) issuing "first day orders" in Chapter 11
(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or guaranteed
by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part
by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or
(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit,
scholarship, or stipend; or
(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as defined in
section 221 (d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor
who is an individual.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006).
231 Bogart, supra note 218, at 805-06 ("And, in fact, notwithstanding the absence of
language in the provision that might directly provide bankruptcy courts with the power to
grant a partial discharge, bankruptcy courts have done so, relying on section 105 and the
equitable power of bankruptcy courts." (footnotes omitted)). For decisions that have granted
a partial discharge of student loan debt, see, for example, Miller v. PHEAA (In re Miller),
377 F.3d 616, 620-21 (6th Cir. 2004), and Myers v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Myers), 280
B.R. 416,420 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002).
232At the moment a bankruptcy petition is filed, § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code
automatically establishes a stay against a debtor's creditors from seeking to collect on their
debts from either the debtor or the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). As Professor
Bogart correctly notes, "Section 362 does not provide relief from process to any parties other
than the debtor. Nevertheless, a variety of courts have relied upon section 105 to grant relief
to third persons who have found themselves subject to claims by creditors of the debtor."
Bogart, supra note 218, at 807. Most often, these third parties are insiders of a corporate
Chapter 11 debtor, such as a chief operating officer, or family members of an individual
debtor who may have provided a guaranty for some of the debtor's obligations. Id. at 807-
08. For decisions that have extended the automatic stay to non-debtor third parties, see, for
example, In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 407 B.R. 606, 616 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (extending the
automatic stay to protect a non-debtor, third-party chief executive officer of the corporate
debtor where the debtor had contractual duties to indemnify the officer), and In re Adelphia
Commc'ns Corp. v. Associated Electric & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd. (In re Adelphia Commc'ns
Corp.), 302 B.R. 439, 449-55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (staying non-bankruptcy litigation
seeking the rescission of director and officer liability policies where an adjudication of
rescission would affect the corporate debtor's reorganization process).
233 When ordered by a bankruptcy court, "[s]ubstantive consolidation results in the
pooling of the assets of, and claims against, two or more entities, thereby satisfying
liabilities from the resultant common fund, eliminating duplicate claims, and combining the
creditors of the two entities for purposes of voting on reorganization plans." Lisanti v.
Lubetkin (In re Lisanti Foods, Inc.), 329 B.R. 491, 497 (D.N.J. 2005). For decisions that
have granted the substantive consolidation of separate entities pursuant to § 105, see, for
example, FDIC v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1992) (utilizing § 105 and
upholding the substantive consolidation between a debtor general partnership and two debtor
individual general partners), and Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Assocs., Ltd., 935 F.2d 245,
250-52 (11 th Cir. 1991) (substantively consolidating a commonly owned debtor corporation
and debtor limited partnership). But see J. Maxwell Tucker, Substantive Consolidation: The
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cases whereby a corporate debtor seeks to make payments post-petition to
certain essential creditors on their pre-petition claims though such conduct
violates the statutorily mandated order of priority among creditors;234 (5)
"recharacterizing" claims of insiders as equity interests;235 and (6) granting
creditors the ability to file late claims or late non-dischargeability complaints. 236
The second school of thought interprets § 105 restrictively and thus
considers a bankruptcy court's equitable power under this section to be
narrowly defined. 237 As Judge Manuel D. Leal explains, "Application of this
restrictive approach is partly due to the constitutional ramifications surrounding
the authority of federal bankruptcy judges who receive their jurisdiction through
a reference from Article III. ' ' 238 Like Leal, scholars such as Professor Bogart
and Professors Steven Nickles and David Epstein argue against a liberal reading
of § 105, contending that judicial rulemaking under the guise of equitable
powers enables bankruptcy courts to circumvent a statute created by Congress,
thereby causing "a breach in the constitutionally required separation of
powers." 239 These are reasonable arguments, and this Article does not question
their soundness or correctness. Nonetheless, it remains the case that in practice
the boundaries of a bankruptcy court to act pursuant to § 105 in various
circumstances are not clear and uniform among the nation's bankruptcy
courts .240
Cacophony Continues, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 89, 116 (2010) (arguing that § 105 does
not authorize a bankruptcy court to order the substantive consolidation of separate estates).234 Bogart, supra note 218, at 811-19. For decisions permitting the use of § 105 to issue
first-day orders, see, for example, In re Wehrenberg, Inc., 260 B.R. 468, 469 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 2001), and In re Just For Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 826 (D. Del. 1999).
235 A bankruptcy court might recharacterize a purported claim to an equity interest in
order to prevent an equity investor from labeling her contribution as a loan, thereby
"circumventing the Bankruptcy Code's priority system by guaranteeing itself a larger
recovery and higher priority if the debtor files for bankruptcy." Menotte v. NLC Holding
Corp. (In re First NLC Fin. Servs., LLC), 396 B.R. 562, 567 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008). For
decisions recharacterizing debt to equity pursuant to § 105, see, for example, GMBH v.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors for
Dornier Aviation (North America), Inc.), 453 F.3d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 2006), and Leesa
Bunch & McMasker Enters., Inc. v. J.M. Capital Fin., Ltd. (In re Hoffmger Indus., Inc.), 327
B.R. 389, 407-11 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005).
236See, e.g., Nicholson v. Isaacman (In re Isaacman), 26 F.3d 629, 635-36 (6th Cir.
1994) (permitting a creditor to file a non-dischargeability complaint past the reported bar
date); Anwiler v. Patchett (In re Anwiler), 958 F.2d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding same).2 37 See, e.g., Carlos J. Cuevas, Bankruptcy Code Section 105(a) Injunctions and State
and Local Administrative and Civil Enforcement Proceedings, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
365,371-72(1996).
2 38 Leal, supra note 223, at 490.
2 39 Bogart, supra note 218, at 820; Nickles & Epstein, supra note 228, at 18 ("The
constitutional problem is not so much in Congress delegating wide powers to the courts
through [§] 105(a). The real problem is that in exercising such wide powers, the courts are
making law to the extent of violating the constitutional separation of powers.").
240 COLLIER, supra note 221, 105.01 [2].
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Thus, to the extent a bankruptcy court favors a liberal reading of § 105,241
or is simply inclined to order such relief given the factual circumstances of a
debtor allegedly concealing assets from the estate, it remains uncertain whether
a bankruptcy court could exercise its powers to issue a search warrant to a
trustee. Four reasons militate in favor of concluding that § 105 could be utilized
to fashion such relief.
First, one criticism lodged against the expansive use of § 105 is that the
section itself provides that a court may issue any order necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and not the policy
objectives or goals underlying the federal bankruptcy laws.242 Stated slightly
differently, the exercise of § 105 power should be tied to another section of the
Bankruptcy Code, and not used as a source of independent authority.243 Unlike
relief such as substantive consolidation and first-day orders which find no basis
or expression in another Bankruptcy Code provision, the issuance of a search
order for a debtor's residence can reasonably be tied to at least two existing
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 704 of the Code outlines the duties
of a bankruptcy trustee.244 In a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 case, 245 the trustee is
241 One notable bankruptcy authority contends that "[g]iven the broad mandate to
bankruptcy courts generally to reorganize debtors, to afford a fresh start to debtors and to
distribute funds equitably to creditors, an expansive construction [of § 105] is justified." Id.242 Bogart, supra note 218, at 803-04; see also New Eng. Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy Mart
Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.), 351 F.3d 86, 92 (2d
Cir. 2003) ("The statutory language supports this limit on the equitable powers of the
bankruptcy court. The equitable power conferred on the bankruptcy court by section 105(a)
is the power to exercise equity in carrying out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, rather
than to further the purposes of the Code generally, or otherwise to do the right thing. This
language 'suggests that an exercise of section 105 power be tied to another Bankruptcy Code
section and not merely to a general bankruptcy concept or objective."' (citing COLLIER,
supra note 221, 105.01[1])).243 Solow v. Kalikow (In re Kalikow), 602 F.3d 82, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing COLLIER,
supra note 221, 105.01[]).
244 Section 704(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides as follows:
The trustee shall-
(1) collect and reduce to money the property of the estate for which such trustee
serves, and close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests
of parties in interest;
(2) be accountable for all property received;
(3) ensure that the debtor shall perform his intention as specified in section
52 l(2)(B) of this title;
(4) investigate the financial affairs of the debtor;
(5) if a purpose would be served, examine proofs of claims and object to the
allowance of any claim that is improper;
(6) if advisable, oppose the discharge of the debtor;
(7) unless the court orders otherwise, furnish such information concerning the estate
and the estate's administration as is requested by a party in interest;
(8) if the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated, file with the court, with
the United States trustee, and with any governmental unit charged with
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statutorily charged with the responsibility of collecting property of the estate
and investigating the financial affairs of the debtor.246 If a trustee has
reasonable cause to believe that a debtor is concealing assets from the
bankruptcy proceeding, then the trustee cannot fully carry out her statutory
mandate without assistance from the court authorizing a search. In other words,
on those rare occasions when a search of a debtor's home might be necessary,
obtaining a warrant from the court is a mechanism for a trustee to fulfill her
specific duties under § 704 of the Bankruptcy Code.
In addition, § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that upon
commencement of a bankruptcy case, an estate is comprised of "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property. ' 247 At such time, the bankruptcy
estate falls under the control and jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.248 The
estate exists apart from the debtor, and acts through its legal representative, the
bankruptcy trustee.249 Again, if grounds exist to believe that a debtor has been
less than forthcoming regarding the extent of her assets, a search warrant can be
viewed as a tool for a bankruptcy trustee and the court to aggregate fully the
responsibility for collection or determination of any tax arising out of such
operation, periodic reports and summaries of the operation of such business,
including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as
the United States trustee or the court requires;
(9) make a final report and file a final account of the administration of the estate
with the court and with the United States trustee;
(10) if with respect to the debtor there is a claim for a domestic support obligation,
provide the applicable notice specified in subsection (c);
(11) if, at the time of the commencement of the case, the debtor (or any entity
designated by the debtor) served as the administrator (as defined in section 3 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) of an employee benefit plan,
continue to perform the obligations required of the administrator; and
(12) use all reasonable and best efforts to transfer patients from a health care
business that is in the process of being closed to an appropriate health care business
that-
(A) is in the vicinity of the health care business that is closing;
(B) provides the patient with services that are substantially similar to those
provided by the health care business that is in the process of being closed; and
(C) maintains a reasonable quality of care.
11 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006).
245 The main duties of a bankruptcy trustee contained in § 704 are made applicable to
Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases under § 1302(b)(1). See id § 1302(b).246 1d. § 704(a)(1), (4).
247 1d. § 541(a)(1).
248 Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 321 (1931) ("The filing of the petition is an assertion
ofjurisdiction with a view to the determination of the status of the bankrupt and a settlement
and distribution of his estate. This jurisdiction is exclusive within the field defined by the
law, and is so far in rem that the estate is regarded as in custodia legis from the filing of the
petition.").
249In re Raynard, 327 B.R. 623, 628 n.9 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005) (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 323(a)).
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bankruptcy estate and thereby protect its jurisdiction. Indeed, § 105 has been
employed in the past by bankruptcy courts to protect the assets of the estate.
250
Permitting a bankruptcy trustee to search a debtor's home through the auspices
of a search warrant furthers the task of protecting the estate. Section 521(a)(4)
works in tandem with § 541(a)(1), whereby the former prescribes that if a
trustee is serving in the case, then the debtor has a statutory duty to surrender to
the trustee all property of the estate. 251 The concealment of assets by a debtor is
a violation of her statutory duties and inhibits the rightful development of the
bankruptcy estate.
Second, the use of § 105 to issue a search warrant would not override or
disregard any other section of the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Code is
silent on this front, and issuing a warrant to augment the estate and enable a
trustee to administer fully the estate for the benefit of creditors permits § 105 to
operate as the "bankruptcy-specific gap-filling power" that it was originally
intended to be.252
Third, the liberal construction of § 105 also considers the implied policy
goals of bankruptcy law when fashioning relief.253 Perhaps the most widely
recognized underlying policy of consumer bankruptcy law is that a discharge of
indebtedness should be available only to the "honest but unfortunate debtor."
254
Consequently, as a condition precedent to receiving a discharge of
indebtedness, a consumer debtor must demonstrate forthrightness and honesty
throughout the bankruptcy proceeding, including in the disclosures and
financial information provided on the bankruptcy petition and accompanying
schedules. 255 Indeed, accuracy, honesty, and complete disclosure by the debtor
250 Cuevas, supra note 237, at 417 (citing Lazarus Burman Assocs. v. Nat'l Westminster
Bank USA (In re Lazarus Burman Assocs.), 161 B.R. 891, 897-98 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993));
see also Dalton Dev. Project #1 v. Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re UniOil), 948 F.2d
678, 682 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that a "bankruptcy judge has the power to issue any order
which is necessary or appropriate to protect the debtor's estate").
251 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(4).
252 Bogart, supra note 218, at 802; see also Bartel v. Walsh (In re Bartel), 404 B.R. 584,
591 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2009) ("Section 105(a) functions as a 'catch-all' provision, effectively
filling in gaps to 'preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy system."' (quoting Cuevas-Segarra
v. Contreras, 134 F.3d 458, 459 (1st Cir. 1998))).
253 COLLIER, supra note 221, 105.01[2].
254 See Grogan v. Gamer, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) (stating that the "fresh start"
provided by the Bankruptcy Code is intended for the "honest but unfortunate debtor"); see
also Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
1047, 1050 (1987) ("A second goal of bankruptcy is to reward only the honest debtor with a
fresh start. Policymakers have long been concerned that bankruptcy not be a haven for the
dishonest."); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United
States?, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 6 (2001) ("The central tenet of the consumer bankruptcy
system in America has been to offer all 'honest' individual debtors a freely-available,
immediate, unconditional debt discharge in exchange for the surrender of current non-
exempt assets, if any.").255 See In re Slentz, 157 B.R. 418, 420 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1993) ("Since the proper
operation of the bankruptcy system depends, to a large extent, upon debtors honestly and
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are critical to the functioning of the bankruptcy system, and are "inherent in the
bargain for the discharge. '256 Thus, if it is reasonably suspected that a debtor is
abusing the bankruptcy system by attempting to shield distributable assets from
the estate, then upon proper application by a bankruptcy trustee, § 105 should
be employed to fill the void to prevent such conduct-namely, by authorizing a
search of the debtor's residence. 257
Indeed, bankruptcy law has been concerned with preventing and deterring
the fraudulent debtor since at least the Middle Ages.258 For example, England
promulgated the first Anglo-bankruptcy law in 1542 during the reign of King
Henry VIII,259 and its primary purpose was not the rehabilitation of debtors, but
the prevention of fraud by debtors upon their creditors. 260 The subsequent
English bankruptcy statutes treated a debtor as a criminal felon and a moral
failure. 261 Not only were debtors liable for imprisonment for debt, but a penalty
of "pillory and the loss of an ear" could be imposed upon a debtor "who failed
forthrightly completing the schedules and statements which are filed with the court, attempts
at cheating cannot be made to appear too attractive.").2 56 Kestell v. Kestell (In re Kestell), 99 F.3d 146, 149 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing In re
Mascolo, 505 F.2d 274, 278 (1st Cir. 1974)).
257As stated, the use of § 105 to issue a search order is not free from doubt. The court in
Spacone v. Burke (In re Truck-A-Way) did state in passing, but without any explication or
analysis, that the use of § 105(a), standing alone, to enable a trustee to search for allegedly
hidden assets "has no basis in the Constitution, federal statutes, or caselaw." 300 B.R. 31, 36
(E.D. Cal. 2003).258 Cf Gregory E. Maggs, Consumer Bankruptcy Fraud and the "Reliance on Advice of
Counsel" Argument, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 11 (1995) ("Because bankruptcy debtors have
the most to lose from the smooth functioning of these laws, they have throughout history
faced the temptation to thwart the process by concealing or giving away their property.").
259 8 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 236 (1926). This first bankruptcy
law was officially titled, "An Act against such persons as do make bankrupts." Charles
Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 5, 7 (1995).
260HOLDSWORTH, supra note 259. This Act specifically recounted the common
occurrence of debtors, who after
craftily obtaining into their hands great substance of other men's goods, do suddenly
flee to parts unknown, or keep their houses, not minding to pay or restore to any their
creditors, their debts and duties, but at their own wills and pleasures consume the
substance obtained by credit of other men, for their own pleasure and delicate living,
against all reason, equity, and good conscience ....
An Acte Againste Suche Persones as Doo Make Bankrupte, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542)
(Eng.).
261 Vem Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. L.J. 226, 227
(1976) ("The bankrupt who did not honestly surrender up his property and disclose his
affairs was, under this law, to be 'adjudged a fraudulent bankrupt' and a felon."); see also
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 199 (3d ed. 2005) ("Bankruptcy
originally had a quite punitive ring. It was at one time a crime, later a disgrace.").
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to show that bankruptcy was due solely to misfortune." 262 In addition to the
power to punish, the English bankruptcy statutes empowered commissioners to
investigate whether debtors were concealing assets.
The first U.S. bankruptcy law, passed in 1800,263 "had as its conceptual
origin the English bankruptcy system familiar to the Framers of the United
States Constitution." 264 Much like its English antecedents, the Bankruptcy Act
of 1800 established bankruptcy fraud as a criminal offense, and jails were
overflowing with imprisoned debtors in the various states.265 As the nineteenth
century progressed, however, legislators in both England and the United States
began to recognize a moral distinction between fraudulent debtors on the one
hand, and those individuals who had succumbed to financial calamity through
life's misfortunes on the other.266 The successive American bankruptcy acts,
enacted in 1841, 1867 and 1898, respectively, moved slowly but surely in the
direction of the liberal treatment of debtors. The modem Bankruptcy Code,
enacted in 1978,267 is now considered by many to be a pro-debtor statute.
Despite the pro-debtor focus of the current Bankruptcy Code, however, the
potential for debtors to commit fraud, "keep house," 268 or otherwise conceal
assets from the bankruptcy process remains a serious concern.
Fourth, a textual argument exists to support a broad reading of § 105. The
predecessor to § 105, namely, § 2(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Act, provided that a
bankruptcy court may "[m]ake such orders, issue such process, and enter such
262 Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 17 (1919).2 63 Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
2 64 Curry v. Castillo (In re Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 2002); see also DAVID
A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 90 (2001)
("The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was derived from English law, as were parts of the 1841 and
1867 acts .... ); CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTcY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 13 (1935)
(noting that the initial bankruptcy bill introduced in the United States closely followed the
English Bankruptcy Act); Tabb, supra note 254, at 6-7 ("The first United States bankruptcy
law, passed in 1800, virtually copied the existing English law.").
265 WARREN, supra note 264, at 22; see also Countryman, supra note 261, at 228 ("[T]he
colonies and then the states had carried over the English system of imprisonment for debt
and only some of the states had insolvency laws which would give the debtor a discharge or
at least a release from jail.").
266 Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 325, 338 (1991).
267 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006).
268 The concept of "keeping house" refers to the act of a debtor who intentionally seeks
refuge in her home for the purpose of avoiding creditors and civil process. See Jay Cohen,
The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the Development of Discharge in
Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153, 155 (1982); Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy in the
United States, 96 CoM. L.J. 160, 163 (1991); see also Israel Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A
Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Law, 52 HARv. L. REV. 189, 194 (1938) ("This
was the notorious practice of 'keeping house,' by which a debtor, protected by the sanctified
English maxim that a man's house is his castle, would betake himself to his home and there
consume his creditors' goods, utterly immune to forcible intrusion by legal process.").
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judgments... as may be necessary for the enforcement" of the provisions of the
former Bankruptcy Act.269 As quoted above, § 105 now enables bankruptcy
courts to issue any necessary or appropriate orders to carry out the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code.270 As one commentator has argued, the inclusion of the
language "or appropriate" signifies a liberalization of the limits of the powers of
a bankruptcy court.271 No doubt, the ambiguity of the phrase "necessary or
appropriate" can cause considerable judicial confusion. If viewed restrictively,
then any order under § 105 would need to be indispensable to furthering the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 272 In such a case, the issuance of a search
order would not be "necessary" in the technical sense because other remedies
specifically exist under the Bankruptcy Code if a debtor is less than
forthcoming in her disclosures. That is, a court can dismiss the bankruptcy
case 273 or deny the debtor a discharge of preexisting debt.274 While a denial of
discharge may appear to be a significant penalty for committing fraud, a denial
of a discharge leaves the debtor in no worse of a position vis-A-vis her creditors
than before filing for bankruptcy protection.275 In other words, after a denial of
discharge, the existing creditors remain empowered to collect their debts from
the debtor in personam 276 as if the bankruptcy filing never occurred. A denial of
discharge may do nothing to prevent debtor fraud ex ante or during the
bankruptcy proceeding itself.277 But the issuance of a search order to uncover
269 11 U.S.C. § 1 l(a)(15) (1976) (repealed 1978).
2 70 1d. § 105(a) (2006).
271 Brian Leepson, A Case for the Use of a Broad Court Equity Power to Facilitate
Chapter 11 Reorganization, 12 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 775, 795 (1996); see also Amanda
K. Bloch, Approaching the Limits of the Bankruptcy Code: Does Surcharging a Debtor's
Exempt Assets Go Too Far?, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1747, 1755 (2009) (noting that the language
of § 105(a) provides bankruptcy courts with more power than its predecessor).272 See Wacker, supra note 129, at 59 (making a similar argument, but under the All
Writs Act).
273 See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (enabling the court to dismiss a Chapter 13 case "for cause"
upon request of the U.S. Trustee); see also id. § 707(a) (enabling the court to dismiss a
Chapter 7 case "for cause").
274
Id. § 727(a)(2).
275 Nevin M. Gewertz, Comment, Act or Asset? Multiplicitous Indictments Under the
Bankruptcy Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 152, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 909, 912 (2009)
("Significantly, however, civil penalties impose no greater penalty than the original debt
itself. If successful in his fraudulent act, the debtor retains the value of any concealed
assets[;] [ilf caught, the debtor remains in no worse position relative to his creditors."); see
also Ralph C. McCullough, II, Bankruptcy Fraud. Crime Without Punishment, 96 CoM. L.J.
257, 284 (1991) ("Demanding that a debtor restore to the estate assets he has appropriated
will help make up what has been stolen, but it leaves the debtor no worse off than he would
have been had he originally surrendered the assets. He risks nothing by attempting to hide
assets that may later be recovered.").
276 IRS v. Cousins (In re Cousins), 209 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2000) ("The debtor remains
personally liable, however, for any nondischargeable debts.").
277 See James M. Cain, Proving Fraud in Credit Card Dischargeability Actions: A
Permanent State of Flux?, 102 CoM. L.J. 233, 239 n.31 (1997) (observing that the
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debtor fraud would certainly be appropriate given the strong policy favoring
absolute candor by debtors involved in the bankruptcy process. Indeed, such an
order would be appropriate to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy estate and
to promote an accurate distribution of available assets to the creditor
constituency. 278
Commentators critical of an expansive reading of § 105 do agree on this:
since § 105 is modeled after the All Writs Act, § 105 jurisprudence "should be
informed by the All Writs Act jurisprudence." 279 Thus, a conservative reader of
§ 105 would therefore concede that if a search order could be issued pursuant to
the All Writs Act, then a similar order could emanate from § 105 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Thus, we return to the inquiry of whether such relief was
available under the All Writs Act. At least in the criminal law context, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Blackie's House of
Beef Inc. v. Castillo2 80 noted that the power to obtain search warrants "in aid of
jurisdiction" under the All Writs Act is an available procedural device. 281 But,
as noted above, the issue is not free from doubt. If a court adopts a restrictive
interpretation of § 105, then it would decline a request by a trustee to have a
search order issued for a debtor's residence. On the contrary, a court adopting a
liberal interpretation of § 105 might very well accept the notion that § 105 is an
appropriate vehicle for issuing a search order to a trustee, especially when
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 does not apply and no Bankruptcy Code
provision currently speaks to the issue.
C. The Inherent Powers Doctrine as a Source ofAuthority for a
Bankruptcy Court to Issue a Search Warrant
A third possible, but admittedly unlikely, source of authority for a
bankruptcy court to issue a search order is the "inherent powers" doctrine. 282 It
withholding of a discharge is often an empty threat to debtors whose lack of assets removes
any fear of civil remedies); Mary Jo Heston et al., Bankruptcy Fraud: A Roundtable
Discussion, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 275, 279 (1998) (noting that actions to deprive a
debtor of her discharge fail to deter attempts at fraud); Luther Zeigler, Note, The Fraud
Exception to Discharge in Bankruptcy: A Reappraisal, 38 STAN. L. REv. 891, 917 (1986)
(arguing that the penalty of nondischargeability is not an effective penalty for debtor fraud).
2781n re N. Boneless Meat Corp., 9 B.R. 27, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that section
2(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Act, the precursor to § 105(a), may be used "to protect the
integrity of a bankrupt's estate and the Bankruptcy Court's custody thereof').
279 j. Maxwell Tucker, Substantive Consolidation. The Cacophony Continues, 18 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 89, 126 (2010); see also Bogart, supra note 218, at 830 ("The All
Writs Act provides the best model for interpretation and application of section 105 of the
Code.").
280659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
2811d. at 1222.
282 For an exhaustive treatment of the inherent powers doctrine, see Joseph J. Anclien,
Broader Is Better: The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 37
(2008), Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73
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has been said that when Congress provided the federal courts with subject
matter jurisdiction, the courts became possessed with certain inherent
powers.283 Bankruptcy courts, as units of the federal district courts, 284 also have
this authority.285 Federal courts regularly utilize their inherent powers to take
some action that has not been specifically authorized by the Constitution,
statute, or regulation.286 It has been repeatedly noted that federal courts "are
invested with inherent powers that are 'governed not by rule or statute but by
the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.' 287
These inherent powers fall into three categories. The first category
delineates activity "so fundamental to the essence of a court as a constitutional
tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within this sphere is really
to render practically meaningless the terms 'court' and 'judicial power."' 288
Stated differently, once Congress has created an Article III court, the
Constitution vests certain powers thereto into which the other branches of
government may not interfere.28 9 There are few examples of this type of
inherent power. However, in United States v. Klein, the Supreme Court seems
to hold that Congress may not interfere with a court's inherent power to decide
a matter by dictating a particular result.290 It is safe to assume that the specter of
a bankruptcy court issuing a search order would not fall into this first category
of inherent power.
The second category of inherent powers includes those "necessary to the
exercise of all others." 291 These powers have been construed to mean "those
TEX. L. REv. 1805 (1995), Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts
and the Structural Constitution, 86 IowA L. REv. 735 (2000), William F. Ryan, Rush to
Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REv.
761 (1997), and William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental
Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of
the Sweeping Clause, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 102.
283 Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873).
284 See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) ("In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in
regular active service shall constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the
bankruptcy court for that district.").
28 5 John Richards Homes Bldg. Co. v. Adell (In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co.),
404 B.R. 220, 226 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (holding that bankruptcy courts have the inherent
power to issue sanctions); In re Cabrera-Mejia, 402 B.R. 335, 346 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008)
("In addition, all federal courts, including bankruptcy courts, have inherent powers to
enforce their orders and judgments." (citing Caldwell v. Unified Capital Corp. (In re
Rainbow Magazine, Inc.), 77 F.3d 278, 284 (9th Cir. 1996))); Nickles & Epstein, supra note
228, at 10.28 6 Anclien, supra note 282, at 38.
2 87 Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 (9th Cir.
1992) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)).
2 88 Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985).
289In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 901 (5th Cir. 1993).29 0 1d. (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47 (1872)).
291Id. at 902 (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)).
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deemed necessary to protect the efficient and orderly administration of justice
and those necessary to command respect for the court's orders, judgments,
procedures, and authority. '292 Examples of this stripe of inherent power include
the contempt sanction,293 the ability to levy sanctions in response to abusive
litigation practices, 294 the imposition of standards for admission to the bar,295
the flexibility to vacate judgments if tainted by fraud,296 the dismissal of an
action for failure to prosecute,2 97 the inclusion or exclusion of evidence during
trial, 298 and the consolidation of actions arising out of the same controversy. 299
As Professors Nickles and Epstein note, this inherent power is limited to
process closely related to the proper functioning of a tribunal. 300 While
concealing assets contradicts a debtor's duties under the Bankruptcy Code301
and offends the policy underlying consumer bankruptcy law, such conduct does
not inhibit the proper functioning of the bankruptcy court as a tribunal. As such,
this type of inherent power would not provide a court with an ability to issue a
search warrant.
The third category of inherent powers includes "those reasonably useful to
achieve justice. '302 With respect to this category, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit has stated as follows: "[T]he legislature cannot foresee every
tool the courts might need to employ to reach a just result in all cases. Where it
appears that a court cannot adequately and efficiently carry out its duties
without employing some special device, the court has inherent power to do
so."
' 3 0 3 This third category of inherent powers seemingly overlaps with both the
All Writs Act and § 105 insofar as it serves as an interstitial tool for courts to
achieve a just result. 304 Indeed, regarding the capacity of a federal court to issue
2921d
293 Piper, 447 U.S. at 764.
294 Stone, 986 F.2d at 902.
295 Ni v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 267 (2d Cir. 2007).
296 Id.
297 United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 236 (4th Cir. 2007).298 Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 (9th Cir.
1992) (excluding insurer's expert testimony evidence).299 Moussaoui, 483 F.3d at 236.
300 Nickles & Epstein, supra note 228, at 9.
301 Pursuant to § 52 1(a)(1)(B)(i) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor must file a schedule
of all assets and liabilities. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). In addition, § 521(a)(4)
requires that if a trustee is appointed in a case, the debtor must surrender all property of the
estate to the trustee. Id. § 52 1(a)(4).
302In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc.,
757 F.2d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 1985)).303 Id. (citing Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920)). An example of this third
category of inherent power is the ability of a federal court to appoint an auditor to aid in
resolving a complex commercial matter. Id.
304 ITT Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1360 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The doctrine
of inherent powers, as we have indicated, provides a federal court 'with appropriate
instruments required for the performance of [its] duties' and essential to the administration
ofjustice." (alteration in original) (quoting Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. at 312)).
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a writ of injunction under its inherent powers, 305 courts have concluded that the
power is conterminous with a federal court's authority under the All Writs
Act. 3
0 6
While again reflecting on the All Writs Act as an appropriate guide to a
federal court's powers under its inherent authority is what may be called for,
there are at least two valid reasons for declining to do so. First, unlike the All
Writs Act, which is a statutory delegation of authority to federal courts for the
specific purpose of issuing necessary or appropriate writs, the court's inherent
powers do not require the endorsement of Congress; indeed, when courts
exercise their inherent powers, they "essentially create their own procedural
rules" without the endorsement of Congress. 307 Accordingly, this raises a
potential separation of powers concern, as it is the responsibility of Congress to
make both substantive and procedural federal law, which the federal courts are
in turn charged with simply interpreting and applying. 30 8 Indeed, commentators
on the inherent powers doctrine have argued that the use of a federal court's
inherent powers is impermissible when adopting practices in the absence of a
controlling statute or rule of procedure.309 Rather, these scholars contend that
the reliance upon a federal court's inherent powers should be made only when
"indispensably necessary" to achieving a court's fundamental purpose, namely,
the adjudication of actual controversies. 310 Second, unlike the developed
contours of the All Writs Act, "[t]here is no clear standard establishing when
courts may legitimately invoke their inherent powers to take some action that
has not been specifically licensed by rule or statute.'311 The instances in which
305 A writ of injunction would be the order most equivalent to the issuance of an order
compelling a search of a debtor's home.
306 Peters v. Brants Grocery, 990 F. Supp. 1337, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1998) ("It is clear to
the court, based on its reading of the applicable case law, that a court's authority to issue an
injunction against other litigation under its inherent powers is no broader than its authority
under the All Writs Act."). On this note, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit concluded as follows in 1TT Community Development Corp. v. Barton:
At first blush it might appear that inherent powers are broader in scope than those
conferred by the All Writs Act because of the absence of a reference to 'jurisdiction.'
The limitation that inherent powers be used only as required for the performance of
duties suggests, however, that the exigencies of the pending litigation dictate the
breadth of a court's discretion to invoke these powers just as they operate to bridle a
court's discretion under the All Writs Act.
Barton, 569 F.2d at 1360.307 Anclien, supra note 282, at 39.
308 Pushaw, supra note 282, at 739.
309See id. at 743 (arguing that federal courts should be barred from asserting any
"beneficial powers"); see also Ryan, supra note 282, at 776, 779 (describing this as a
"weak" version of a federal court's inherent power); Van Alstyne, supra note 282, at 107
(arguing that the courts should not be permitted to exercise any inherent power unless there
is an indispensable need to do so).3 10 Anclien, supra note 282, at 49.
3 11Id. at41.
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a court has utilized its inherent powers, such as sanctioning counsel or
dismissing a case for lack of prosecution, seem to be far removed from the
issuance of an order authorizing a state actor to search the home of a private
citizen.
VI. CONCLUSION
As stated at the outset, the purpose of this Article is to offer a reasonable
answer to a question that has not been raised by the case law or the academic
literature.312 Admittedly, one way to obviate the issue of a bankruptcy trustee's
ability to seek a search order would be for the trustee to refer the matter to a
federal law enforcement officer or to the appropriate U.S. Attorney's Office
who in turn would request a search warrant on the trustee's behalf. Doing so
would circumvent the need for a court to rely upon either the All Writs Act or
§ 105 as its source of authority, and cause Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41 to come into play. This route, however, would prove impractical for at least
two reasons.
First, as it currently stands, in general the U.S. Attorneys' Offices around the
country have been reluctant to devote scarce resources for the prosecution of
bankruptcy crimes, so requiring a trustee to make a referral and wait for the
appropriate U.S. Attorney's Office to act would not accomplish much to combat
debtor fraud. Second, the need for trustees to act quickly is imperative because
assets most debtors possess are easily transferrable or hidden. Consequently, if
there are pronounced time delays between a referral for a warrant and the ensuing
application by a federal law enforcement officer or an Office of the U.S.
Attorney, an undeserving debtor may succeed in abusing the bankruptcy system.
Other ways to remedy the void are for Congress either to amend the
Bankruptcy Code to provide bankruptcy courts with the ability to issue
administrative search warrants upon application by a bankruptcy trustee, in
accordance with established Fourth Amendment parameters, or, as suggested by
Professor A. Mechele Dickerson, to revise the Bankruptcy Code to provide that
one of a debtor's duties is to consent to a search of her home. 313 There is no
question that either of these solutions would be best. However, this issue is not
at the forefront of Congress's agenda, and it may never be.
Thus, what is left is a casus omissus. In order to fill this void and prevent
future fraudulent conduct by undeserving debtors, bankruptcy courts should rely
upon either the All Writs Act or § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code in combating
such activity.
312For the scholarly literature on the intersection between bankruptcy law and the
Fourth Amendment, see A. Mechele Dickerson, Can the "Public Interest" Justify Non-
Consensual Searches of Homes in Bankruptcy Cases?, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 267
(2002); Kuretich, supra note 169, Sousa, supra note 5, and Jennifer Taylor, Note, Some
Bargain: How Bankruptcy Courts May Now Require a Debtor to Relinquish Expectations of
Privacy as a Condition of the Bankruptcy Bargain, 56 HASTINGs L.J. 609 (2004).
313 Dickerson, supra note 312, at 302.
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